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ABSTRACT
INFERRING INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES AND LATENT
BEHAVIORAL FACTORS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
Liangbin Yang
Eric T. Bradlow
Peter S. Fader
This dissertation extends prior research on inferring individual preferences from the fol-
lowing two aspects: one is to examine important latent behavioral factors affecting con-
sumers’ consumption decisions; the other is to overcome the challenges arising from in-
complete information. Regarding latent behavioral factors, this dissertation considers the
following two aspects: (1) three types of intragroup dynamics behavior, and (2) variety-
seeking behavior. Regarding incomplete information, this dissertation focuses on two types
of incomplete information: individual’s behavior and identity, and order of consumption.
Specifically, Chapter 2 presents a method to infer heterogeneous individual preferences
and three components of intragroup dynamics using just aggregate and de-identified data.
Chapter 3 emphasizes the effect of consumption outcomes on an individual’s propensity for
variety-seeking when the order of consumption is unobserved. To overcome the challenges
arising from incomplete information, this dissertation develops advanced individual-level
Bayesian models and uses two-step iterative algorithms to estimate the proposed models in
an MCMC framework. In-depth simulation studies show that the parameters are well re-
covered, suggesting that the proposed models are identified. Furthermore, this dissertation
shows that ignoring latent behavioral factors may lead to biased estimation of individual
preferences, which could result in many consequences. This dissertation applies the pro-
posed methods to two empirical settings: an individual-level TV viewing and targeted TV
advertising setting using Nielsen People Meter (NPM) data, and an online video game
environment. In the TV viewing setting, it is shown that the proposed method could sig-
v
nificantly improve the efficiency of TV ad targeting through counterfactual analysis. In
the video-game environment, results show that although there is extensive heterogeneity,
on average, positive consumption outcomes lead to inertial preferences, while negative
consumption outcomes lead to variety-seeking. In sum, this dissertation shows the impor-
tance to incorporate important latent behavioral factors in inferring heterogeneous individ-
ual preferences especially when data are incomplete, and proposes innovative methods to
overcome the challenges emerging from incomplete information.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Today, rapid advancement of technology enables marketers to reach individual customers
with customized marketing strategies in many ways such as online ads, emails and so on.
It is widely accepted that a customized ad for individual customers can be much more ef-
fective than a universal “one-size-fits-all” one for all customers. However, the advantage
of individually customized marketing strategies does not “come for free.” Firms need to
correctly infer individual’s preferences before they send out effective ads or recommen-
dations to individual customers. Correspondingly, a great body of research in marketing
has been done to reveal a customer’s preferences based on his/her historical consumption
behavior (Allenby & Rossi 1998). For example, based on a customer’s historical purchase
data, choice models infer the customer’s preferences on each of several brands in a product
category. A retailer then may be able to send the customer customized ads based on his/her
preferences.
However, most existing models that examine individual preferences come with an implicit
assumption that customers make their decisions individually, without any interaction with
other customers or environment when they make decisions. Such assumptions are unlikely
to hold in some cases and may cause bias in the estimation of individual preferences. For
1
example, individuals in a household may make consumption decisions together instead of
alone. In this case, it is important to take into account the interaction among household
members. Therefore, it is more challenging than it looks to correctly infer customers’
individual preferences in joint decision-making environments.
In this dissertation, we intend to overcome some challenges associated with inferring in-
dividual preferences and latent behavioral factors in marketing practice; more importantly,
we develop novel methods and models, as well as innovative estimation algorithms, and ap-
ply them to empirical marketing contexts. We hope that this dissertation will help marketers
overcome the challenges emerging from incomplete information and avoid possible biases
in inferring individual preferences using existing methods, and shed some light on how to
incorporate important latent behavioral factors which may significantly affect customers’
consumption decisions.
Specifically, we look into the following two challenges in this dissertation. One is to take
into account the important latent behavioral factors that affect customers’ consumption de-
cisions (in addition to the product or brand itself). In this dissertation, we focus on factors
coming from two sources: one is the possible social influence and agent-to-agent interac-
tions; the other is possible interactions with past consumption behavior of the customer
himself/herself. Specifically, we focus on the cases that customers may make decisions in
a group setting (for example, household members make a decision together about where
to travel for their vacation). Over the last few decades, many researchers define a group
from various perspectives (e.g., interdependence, shared identification, shared goals, shared
tasks, structure, categorization, and so on). For instance, Shaw (1981) defines a group as
“two or more persons who are interacting with one another in such a manner that each
person influences and is influenced by each other person” (Shaw 1981, p454). To better
understand individuals’ preferences, we will have to learn about the complex social ac-
tions, processes and changes that happen within a group, i.e., within-group or intragroup
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dynamics (Lewin 1951). Thus, we would like to take into account possible intragroup
dynamics when we model individuals’ preferences.
Second, we take into account possible effects from individual’s prior consumption experi-
ence, especially for experiential products such as playing video games or watching movies.
In particular, if a customer consumes a brand or an option intensively, he/she may become
satiated to the brand/option and exhibit variety-seeking behavior by switching to different
brands/options, or may become “locked-in” by the brand/option and exhibit inertial be-
havior by consistently choosing the same brand/option. In this case, the customer’s prior
consumption affects his/her choices in the future, in addition to his/her intrinsic prefer-
ence of each brand/option. Furthermore, such variety-seeking or inertia behavior may be
affected by the valence of the experience gained in the consumption (especially for experi-
ential products). For example, a video game player may be more likely to continue to play
if he/she has a good experience in a previous round than a bad one. Thus, it is important
to account for the consumption experience of outcomes and related variety-seeking/inertia
behavior when we infer individuals’ preferences.
Another challenge in inferring individuals’ preferences is that sometimes data are not
“complete”. Many reasons can cause incomplete data, such as technical issues (e.g., it
is difficult to track customers’ offline behavior), or privacy regulation, and so on. In this
dissertation, we investigate two possible sources of incomplete data. One is that we may
have missing information about individuals’ behavior and identity, so only aggregate and
de-identified data are available. This refers to the cases that we observe the total consump-
tion for a group of customers but we do not know how many and which of them consume
which product. For instance, we observe members in a household (that consists of a hus-
band and a wife) watch sports three times in a week, but we do not know who watches
each time (either the husband, or the wife, or both of them). This is a very general problem
in marketing. As long as multiple consumers may share the same account or device, we
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may have the same issue. Such kind of missing information brings challenges to estimat-
ing individual preferences since the data available are at the aggregate level, and we would
have to first infer individual-level consumption behavior before we estimate the individual
preferences.
Another source of incomplete data we examine is the missing information about the order
of consumption (or the timing of the consumption). This refers to the case that we observe
the consumptions in a period, but we do not know the consumption order: which item was
consumed first, etc. For example, we observe that a video game player plays three rounds
of a video game in a day, but we do not know which round comes first, and which one
comes last. Or a Netflix user rents several DVDs together, but we do not observe in which
order this user watches the DVDs. Or a customer purchases multiple items in one shopping
occasion, and his or her consumption order is not recorded or trackable. This type of
missing information brings challenges to examine the consumption sequences across time,
since we would first have to infer the order of consumption taking place to investigate the
relationship among multiple consumption events across time.
Inferring behavioral factors has been investigated by many researchers using different types
of data. The majority of previous studies have extensively focused on understanding ob-
served or unobserved behavioral factors based on complete information (i.e., the important
information is not missing in the data). Relatively few studies examine how to infer ob-
served or unobserved behavioral factors when information is incomplete. Although with
technology advances, the data we collect may be much richer than before, unfortunately,
it is often that we are “data rich but information poor.” It is not rare that critical infor-
mation is missing even with big data. It would seem, therefore, that further investigation
on how to infer latent behavioral factors with incomplete information are needed. Table
1.1 summarizes that this dissertation bridges the task of better understanding important la-
tent behavioral factors with overcoming the essential challenges in information availability,
4
aiming to fill this important gap in the literature.
Table 1.1: Inferring Behavioral Factors with Different Types of Data
Information
Complete Incomplete
Behavioral Factors
Observable
Unobservable This dissertation
In this dissertation, demonstrating ways to overcome the two challenges discussed above,
we present two essays in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 on inferring individual preferences and
latent behavioral factors with incomplete information, as shown in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Comparison of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3
Incomplete Information
Individual’s
Behavior and
Identity
Order of
Consumption
Unobserved
Behavioral
Factors
Intragroup
Dynamics
Chapter 2
Variety-
Seeking/Inertia
Chapter 3
In Chapter 2, “Inferring Individual Preferences and Intragroup Dynamics with Aggre-
gate and De-identified Data: An Application to Targeted TV Advertising,” we present
a method that can be used to model and infer customers’ consumption, preferences and
intragroup dynamics at the individual level when there is a lack of rich individual-level
data. The model aims to enable customized marketing strategies (e.g., personalization) in
areas where individual behavior and consumption is difficult to track and observe, such
as offline shopping and TV ad targeting. Specifically, this chapter proposes a joint con-
sumption theory taking into account intragroup dynamics, state dependence, time-varying
factors, and observed/unobserved heterogeneity, to estimate the model with just aggregate
and de-identified data. The proposed method can disentangle three potentially confounded
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components of intragroup dynamics: 1) preference revision, i.e. when an individual’s pref-
erences depend on the preferences of others, 2) behavioral interaction, i.e. when an individ-
ual’s consumption utility depends on the choices of other group members, and 3) decision
power, i.e. the influence an individual exerts when his or her group makes a decision. We
propose a new identification strategy which relies on two important identification sources
and an innovative estimation algorithm, followed by a series of in-depth simulation studies
where we validate the proposed method, identification strategy, and estimation algorithm.
Finally, we conduct a series of calibrated counterfactual simulations demonstrating that our
proposed model will enable advertisers to significantly improve the efficiency of targeting
intragroup individuals.
In Chapter 3, “Inferring Individual Preferences and Variety Seeking with Non-Ordered
Data: An Application to Video Games,” we propose a method that examines the variety-
seeking behavior at the individual and attribute level, and estimate the proposed model
using incomplete data where the order of consumption occasions is missing. At the heart
of the model, we propose that consumers may become variety-seeking in response to the
valence of consumption outcomes which indicate the quality of the consumer’s experi-
ence for a specific consumption occasion. We predict that positive consumption outcomes
will generally lead to inertial preferences, while negative consumption outcomes lead to
variety-seeking. Accordingly, in our model, we allow variety-seeking to be a function of
consumption outcomes. Furthermore, we allow the variety-seeking to vary across attributes
of the options, which provides managerial insights to product design. We test our hypothe-
ses within a context of an online video game, in which players choose between different
map environments for each round of play, and consumption outcomes can be measured
objectively by a player’s performance during the round. We observe consumption out-
comes that are consistent with our hypotheses, suggesting that in our context, in general,
firms should place players in a familiar environment in the next round of play if they are
performing well, and introduce variety if they are performing poorly. Since heterogeneity
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in variety-seeking across players is observed, this suggests the importance to incorporate
customized strategies to individual players.
In sum, in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we propose novel methods to overcome challenges
arising from incomplete information and incorporate important latent behavioral factors
mentioned above to help marketers better understand heterogeneous individual preferences
and design corresponding marketing strategies more efficiently. Specifically, regarding
modeling important latent behavioral factors that affect customers’ consumption decisions,
Chapter 2 takes into account possible intragroup influence and interactions, while Chap-
ter 3 considers variety seeking and inertial behavior, and other possible interactions and
correlations with past consumption behavior of each customer himself/herself. In terms of
overcoming the challenge of incomplete information, Chapter 2 tackles the issue of missing
information on individual’s behavior and identity while Chapter 3 addresses the problem
of missing information on the order of the consumption. In both chapters, we use in-depth
simulation studies to validate the proposed methods and estimation algorithms, and apply
the proposed model to empirical contexts. This dissertation shows the importance of incor-
porating latent behavioral factors in inferring individual preferences especially when the
data are incomplete, and proposes innovative methods to overcome the challenges emerg-
ing from incomplete information.
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Chapter 2
Inferring Individual Preferences and
Intragroup Dynamics with Aggregate
and De-identified Data: An Application
to Targeted TV Advertising
2.1 Introduction
With rapid and tremendous technological advancements and breakthroughs, there has been
a growing interest in personalization. Research conducted by EPiServer indicated that there
were already about 33% of U.S. marketers in 2011 who believed that personalized cam-
paigns were “highly effective and measurable”1. In September 2016, a marketing research
company, Ascend2, found that 50% of marketers believed that sending individualized mes-
sages was the most efficient strategy for various marketing campaigns2. In 2017, according
1“Personalized marketing brings rewards and challenges -difficulties in managing data hinder more per-
sonalized efforts.” eMarketer, June 2, 2011, June 3, 2017 accessed.
2“Email marketing strategies: survey summary report.” Ascend2, September 2016, June 3, 2017 accessed.
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to a recent study conducted by Evergage, 88% of marketers in their study stated that ef-
forts in personalization generated high payoffs and provided substantial and measurable
improvements3.
However, the majority of U.S. marketers haven’t implemented personalization4. It is sur-
prising that even for email which is the most common and successful application for person-
alization, there are still about 61% of marketers who never reach their customers through
personalized emails5. If most marketers believe in the effectiveness of individualized mes-
sages and products, why hasn’t the industry widely adopted personalization? One possible
explanation is due to several barriers that exist towards implementing personalization. The
biggest challenges are the inability of gaining insights from data (40%) and unavailability
of individual-level data (39%)6. It goes without saying that the ability to send customized
messages to targeted individuals is primarily based on data availability, as well as data
analysis methods and techniques. Among the challenges, it seems that data availability is
a basic premise of implementing personalization. Without rich information about individ-
uals, it is difficult for marketers to predict an individual customer’s behavior, needs and
wants. As a result, online and digital media have attracted the most attention in personal-
ization so far, where it is relatively easy to track and observe individual’s information.
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that tailoring messages and products for offline customers is
equally important7. Studies showed that 95% of marketers who adopted personalization in
their offline channels had noticed a measurable improvement in conversion rates, outrank-
ing any online and digital channels studied8. Unfortunately, in most offline cases, as well as
3“2017 trends in personalization survey report.” Evergage, 2017, June 3, 2017 accessed.
4“Personalized marketing brings rewards and challenges -difficulties in managing data hinder more per-
sonalized efforts.” eMarketer, June 2, 2011, June 3, 2017 accessed.
5“Personalization research: how retailers personalize across five channels.” Certona, 2017, June 3, 2017
accessed.
6“What are personalization’s biggest challenges and opportunities?” Marketingcharts, July 24, 2014, June
3, 2017 accessed.
7“Offline personalization matters just as much: marketers who personalize offline most likely to see lift
in conversions.” eMarketer, January 14, 2015, June 3, 2017 accessed.
8“Offline personalization matters just as much: marketers who personalize offline most likely to see lift
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many online cases, it is often difficult to monitor and collect information at the individual
level. Correspondingly, it is very common that only group (e.g., household) data, instead
of individual-level data, are available. For example, retail scanner data often only include
transaction information for each household but not for individuals in the same household.
With retail scanner data, we know when a household purchases what product (e.g., yo-
gurt), but we do not know which individual within the household purchases/consumes the
products. This becomes a big roadblock which prevents many retailers from adopting and
implementing personalization.
Furthermore, in some cases where marketers can collect individual’s information from their
customers, the data collected are often “de-identified”: the individual-level information ob-
served isn’t connected with each person’s identity. For instance, for a two-member house-
hold which has two TVs, if we observe that two different programs are being watched at
the same time in this household, we know that two members are watching different pro-
grams but still don’t know who is watching which one. De-identified data is a common
issue not only for offline but also online environments (Novak et. al, 2015). In many on-
line scenarios, individuals’ identity can also be unobservable because of various reasons,
such as privacy regulations, technical limitations, or non-technical reasons (e.g., multiple
people may share an online account or a computer which makes it difficult to identify who
is logging in the online account or using the computer).
It is worth noting that this problem doesn’t arise purely because the data collected lacks
individual-level information or are de-identified. Today, everyone lives in a social world.
Many people prefer making decisions and enjoying daily activities together with others
rather than being alone. Such kinds of choices and consumption processes are often com-
plicated, not only driven by intragroup heterogeneous individual preferences, but also by
intragroup dynamics (e.g., individuals’ preferences and choices are influenced by others
within the group, etc.). For example, a wife may watch the Super Bowl with her husband,
in conversions.” eMarketer, January 14, 2015, June 3, 2017 accessed.
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not because she likes watching football, but just because she enjoys watching TV with her
husband. Another obstacle which impedes the advance of personalization is that intragroup
dynamics data are normally unavailable. The importance of intragroup dynamics defines
this problem to be different from a simple assignment problem (who is watching). That
is, we cannot resolve this fundamental problem by simply collecting better individual-level
data and directly using independent single-agent consumer models to assign the consump-
tion information to an individual consumer. In many cases, we will need to infer the latent
behavioral factors (e.g., intragroup dynamics in this chapter) with missing information on
intragroup interaction.
Given that most data we have today are aggregate and de-identified, many marketers had no
choices for decades but to use the group (e.g., household) as the unit of analysis, which typi-
cally assumes homogeneous preferences within a group and ignores intragroup interactions
and influence. In some cases, it may be reasonable to assume homogeneous preferences
within a group and use the group as the unit of analysis, or it may be possible that het-
erogeneous individual preferences and complex intragroup dynamics can cancel out with
aggregation (Adamowicz et al. 2005); however, making individual-level inferences with-
out incorporating the role of heterogeneity and intragroup dynamics could lead to biased
estimates and erroneous predictions (Yang, Narayan and Assael 2006).
Undoubtedly, modeling heterogeneous individual preferences and incorporating possible
intragroup interactions and influence have great importance to infer individuals’ prefer-
ences and exercise personalization appropriately and efficiently. Take the application in this
chapter, household TV viewing and targeted TV advertising, as an example. We demon-
strate that when constrained by aggregate and de-identified set-top box (STB) data, without
properly inferring individual preferences and intragroup dynamics, targeted TV advertising
campaigns will be inefficient. Consider a beauty product company that wants to broadcast
its female beauty product ad. With STB data, this company observes only the viewing
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behavior from each TV, without knowing who is (are) watching and which program (if
more than one program is being watched simultaneously) is watched by whom. Airing its
ad while a male but not a female is watching can be much less effective. The inability
of targeting heterogeneous individuals within the same household becomes a great barrier
for multichannel video programming distributors (MVPD) and networks to compete with
online/digital advertising platforms. This may be one of the reasons why marketers are
gradually moving away from traditional offline media (e.g., TV), and allocating more and
more of their ad budgets to online/digital media, which has more advanced ad targeting
technology to reach relevant individuals, not just households (Vranica and Perlberg 2015).
Not only does TV advertisers face this pressing issue but also many other marketing con-
texts. For instance, more than one individual may use the same computer (e.g., public
computer) to browse online content, multiple group members may play games together on
a video-game console, or household members often share the same store loyalty account
(e.g., grocery store loyalty account) or club membership (e.g., Amazon Prime, Costco
membership, museum membership). As long as two or more group members share the
same device/account, this issue exists. In these cases, due to the aggregate and de-identified
nature of information, it is questionable to simply deliver targeted ads/promotions based on
the historical behavior observed from the same device/account without recognizing the im-
portant roles of unobserved heterogeneous individual preferences and intragroup dynamics.
When two or more group members share the same device or account and only aggregate
and de-identified data are available, personalization seems unrealizable. Inability to infer
heterogeneous individual’s preferences and intragroup dynamics becomes a great barrier
for marketers to underpin new waves of marketing innovations. This motivates us to look
closely into how to jointly infer heterogeneous individual preferences and intragroup dy-
namics with commonly available aggregate and de-identified data.
Although considerable research has been devoted to inferring individual behavior using
12
aggregate-level data (e.g., Chen & Yang 2007; Feit et al. 2013; Musalem, Bradlow & Raju
2008, etc.), rather less attention has been paid to jointly infer heterogeneous individual
preferences and intragroup dynamics. This chapter is different from previous research that
has studied individual behavior using only aggregate-level data in several ways. First, an
interesting feature of TV viewing is that household members can share the “viewership”.
In other words, when two or more household members watch a TV program together, we
only observe one view. This is different from previous studies which focus on consumption
of regular goods or products. For example, in the orange juice setting examined by Chen
and Yang (2007), if each of two individuals consumes one bottle of orange juice, then they
observe consumption of two bottles, but not one. That is, we don’t observe the variation
of quantity, which brings us another level of uncertainty which needs to be resolved: when
a view is observed, it not only can be watched by one of household members but also can
be watched by any possible combinations of them. Second, prior literature which focuses
on inferring individual behavior using aggregate-level data usually assumes that individu-
als’ preferences are independent. We extend prior work by inferring not only intragroup
heterogeneous individuals’ preferences (e.g., whether the wife in the example above likes
watching sports) but also allowing dependent individuals’ preferences (e.g., the wife in the
example above enjoys watching TV with her husband).
Recently, there has been a growing interest in inferring intragroup dynamics using individual-
level data (e.g., Arora and Allenby 1999; Kato and Matsumoto 2009; Yang, Narayan and
Assael 2006; Yang et al. 2010; Zhang et al. 2009, etc.). First, each prior study in this
stream tends to focus on one component of intragroup dynamics9. We investigate three
important components of intragroup dynamics simultaneously to help marketers better un-
derstand how group members affect and shift each other’s preferences persistently, how
group members interact with each other across time, and how group members make group
decisions with and without conflict. To our knowledge, this chapter is the first to simul-
9Kato and Matsumoto (2009) focus on two components of intragroup dynamics.
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taneously examine these three intragroup dynamics components. Second, we show in this
chapter that marketers can disentangle these three potentially confounded components of
intragroup dynamics using just aggregate and de-identified data.
We first propose a theory of joint consumption by developing a novel individual-level joint
consumption model and incorporating two major types of group-decision making mecha-
nisms, which takes heterogeneous individual-level preferences, intragroup dynamics (e.g.,
interactions and influence across individuals) and state dependence (interactions across
time) into account. We directly model intragroup dynamics to examine how group members
influence and shift each other’s preferences in a long-term stable way, how group members
interact with each other across time, and how group members exercise their influence when
they make group decisions with and without conflict.
Specifically, we look into the following three aspects: 1) preference revision; 2) behavioral
interaction and 3) decision power. In the context of household TV viewing, these three
aspects refers to the following three examples respectively: 1) if member A in a household
likes comedy, member B may be influenced by member A and become a person who likes
comedy; 2) if member A is watching TV, member B may be more (less) likely to watch TV
since he/she enjoys (hates) the time watching TV with member A; 3) when member A and
member B watch TV together, the one with higher decision power may have the authority
to decide or largely influence what program the group will watch.
We then further investigate our model and method using real data on TV viewing and tar-
geted TV advertising setting. Specifically, we use Nielsen People Meter (NPM) data to
examine TV viewing choices. In particular, we estimate our model through two Bayesian
steps iteratively, following and extending previous literature (e.g. Tanner & Wong 1987): first,
we use data augmentation to impute missing data about individual choices, and then we es-
timate the model using the individual-level choice data generated in the data augmentation
step. In the imputation step, we provide an algorithm which simultaneously incorporates
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the dependence of time-correlated missing information and the uncertainty of estimated
values to estimate the unobserved state dependence across time. In the modeling step using
the augmented individual level data, we implement a Gibbs sampling framework to esti-
mate the model. Our estimation results show the existence of intragroup heterogeneity and
intragroup dynamics as well as strong state dependence across periods. We also find that
part of the heterogeneity in base preferences and intragroup dynamics can be explained by
household-level covariates and individual’s demographics including income, age, gender
and working hours.
The identification of the model is achieved by leveraging cross-sectional and longitudinal
variation, with the existence of single-member groups, changes of available choice sets
and time-varying factors. We demonstrate the identification and validity of the proposed
model in several ways: a discussion, an empirical validation and a series of simulations.
Specifically, we first discuss the intuition of our identification strategy with some simulation
studies to show how variation at the aggregate level help us identify the preferences and
group dynamics at the individual level. Second, we use simulation studies to create data
sets (at the aggregate level) and then estimate the proposed model using the simulated data
sets; we are able to recover the simulated parameters and also show that ignoring intragroup
heterogeneous individual preferences and/or intragroup dynamics causes biased estimates
and yields several consequences for marketing managers. Finally, the proposed model and
its identification are also validated by the empirical application to the TV targeting setting
using NPM data. In the empirical settings, we show that our proposed model outperforms
benchmark models regarding model fit, the efficiency of targeting, and economic outputs.
To summarize, methodologically, we propose a new individual-level model and a novel
algorithm to infer individual preferences and intragroup dynamics using just commonly
available aggregate and de-identified data. With our method, marketers can better under-
stand who actually consumes the products, and how individuals within a group interact
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with and influence each other. We propose an identification strategy by leveraging cross-
sectional and longitudinal variation, with the existence of single-member groups, changes
of available choice sets and time-varying factors to identify heterogeneous individual pref-
erences and different components of intragroup dynamics.
Theoretically, this chapter addresses several important gaps in the literature. First, we de-
velop a joint consumption theory and emphasize three important components of intragroup
dynamics (i.e., preference revision, behavioral interaction, and decision power). To date,
there has been little systematic investigation that has considered multiple components of
intragroup dynamics in the same study. Second, unlike most previous literature on esti-
mating individual-level models using aggregate data which usually looks into the cases at
the market level, we provide a model at a more granular level where the influence and in-
teractions among individuals are usually strong, such as intra-household. Third, different
from prior studies on intragroup consumption which either focus on private consumption
(i.e., consumer consumes products alone) or public consumption (i.e., consumers consume
products together), our study extends the prior work and allows products (e.g., TV viewing
in our setting) to be consumed both privately (e.g., watch TV alone) and publicly (e.g.,
watch TV together with others). Moreover, the information we have in our setting is even
more incomplete: we don’t observe the variation of quantity to infer whether a consump-
tion choice is private or public. Last but not least, our study advances the understanding of
intragroup consumption and decision making in a household TV viewing setting.
Managerially, we applied our method to household TV viewing and targeted TV advertis-
ing. We show that our proposed method will enable advertisers to better target within-
household individuals and significantly improve the effectiveness of ad targeting. The
proposed model can potentially be used in many marketing contexts where only group-
level data are observed. For example, in the TV viewing context examined in this chapter,
marketers usually observe household data only and thus target customers at the household-
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level. With the proposed method, marketers may now be able to infer preferences and
choices of individuals within a household and thus effectively target intragroup individuals
accordingly. Retailing is another area where the proposed method can contribute. Retailers
usually observe transactions made by households while they do not observe how individ-
uals in a household consume the purchased products. The proposed method can provide
important insights for retailers about how to design efficient customized marketing strate-
gies, such as coupon design and promotion strategies.
In sum, this chapter is a supplement to several streams of literature, including the literature
on estimating individual-level models with aggregate data, the literature on inferring intra-
group dynamics with individual-level data, and the literature on intragroup consumption
and decision making. We argue that ignoring intragroup heterogeneous individual prefer-
ences and intragroup dynamics results in biased estimates and yields several consequences.
We develop a theory of joint consumption which accounts for intragroup dynamics, state
dependence, and observed and unobserved heterogeneity, propose a novel identification
strategy and an innovative algorithm to overcome the challenges arising from identifica-
tion and estimation, apply the proposed method to a household TV viewing and targeted
TV advertising setting using Nielsen People Meter (NPM) data, and demonstrate that the
proposed method significantly improves the efficiency of targeting intragroup individuals.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2, we introduce our theory of
joint consumption and a model incorporating three potentially confounded components of
intragroup dynamics and state-dependence. This is followed by an estimation and identi-
fication discussion in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, we apply our model to TV viewing and
TV targeted advertising context using a novel data set obtained from Nielsen, and conduct
a series of model comparisons and a counterfactual analysis. Discussion of potential future
extensions of the proposed method is provided in Section 2.5. Finally, in Section 2.6, we
provide a summary of conclusions, managerial findings, and implications.
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2.2 Theory of Joint Consumption
In this section, we introduce our theory of joint consumption by defining latent preference
(including two components: base preference and preference revision), individual-level util-
ity for joint consumption, and group decision-making processes respectively. As discussed
above, unlike prior studies which either focus on private consumption (i.e., consumer con-
sumes products alone) or public consumption (i.e., consumers consume products together),
we extend the prior work and allow products to be consumed both privately and/or publicly.
For the sake of simplicity, in what follows we focus on a group (e.g., a household) h that
consists of two members (i = A, B; member A and member B). We discuss how to gener-
alize our model to more than two group members in Section 2.5. Our joint consumption
theory consists of three parts: 1) latent preference; 2) individual-level utility for joint con-
sumption; 3) group decision-making process.
Specifically, we assume and model the following: first, each household member (member
A or member B) has his or her base preference before forming a group (i.e., h) in period
t0. This base preference drives his or her original choices. When household h is formed
and two members cohabitate, there is a preference revision process in which household
members influence and shift each other’s preferences. This preference revision process
can be continued until preferences of both members reach steady states such that their
preferences do not change any longer. We call these new steady states of preferences as
“revised preferences”. After household h is formed, the preference revision process com-
pletes and is irreversible. From t = 1, individual household member’s utility for joint con-
sumption in each period depends on his/her revised latent preference, as well as temporal
factors including behavioral interaction, state-dependence, observed time-varying factors
and unobserved random shocks. Each household member may have different influence
(i.e., decision power) for joint consumption. To make a decision, each household member
18
follows a predefined decision-making mechanism10to maximize either individual-level or
household-level utility.
2.2.1 Latent Preference: Base Preference and Preference Revision
2.2.1.1 Base Preference
In this chapter, we refer to an individual’s original preferences before forming a group as
base preference (zA0hg , z
B0
hg for member A and B in household h over a choice g in period
t0 ). When two members (A and B) form a group and cohabitate, they influence each
other’s preferences; as a result, their preferences are permanently changed or shifted to
their revised preferences (zAhg and z
B
hg) respectively.
Similar to previous literature (Allenby and Rossi 1998; Yang, Narayan and Assael 2006),
we first describe the base preferences of member A and member B in a household h by ex-
ogenous covariates (e.g., explanatory variables: age, income, education, etc.). Specifically,
we have
zA0hg = X
A
hg ·βg + vzA0hg (2.1)
zB0hg = X
B
hg ·βg + vzB0hg (2.2)
where
(
vzA0hg ,v
zB0
hg
)
∼ MV N [0,Σz]. XAhg (XBhg) is a vector containing an intercept (the term
“1”) and explanatory variables that could be either specific to member A (B), such as age, or
common to both of them, such as household income. XAhg ·βg (XBhg ·βg) captures the observed
heterogeneity in base preference of member A (member B); whereas vzA0hg (v
zB0
hg ) captures
the unobserved heterogeneity in base preference of member A (B), in which v stands for
unobserved heterogeneity. Σz describes the unobserved covariation between member A and
10Two group decision-making mechanisms have been tested in this chapter.
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member B before forming a household. There may be some unobserved factors which are
correlated with the decision of group formation and cohibitation for member A and member
B. For instance, member A and member B cohibitate because they have several common
interests, such as travelling. If this is the case, the elements in Σz tend to be positive for
household h.
2.2.1.2 Preference Revision
When household h is formed and two members cohabitate, there is a preference revision
process in which household members influence and shift each other’s preferences. There is
a growing body of literature recognizing the notion of interdependent preferences among
members (e.g., Aribarg, Arora, and Bodur 2002; Case 1991; Yang and Allenby 2003; Yang,
Narayan and Assael 2006). However, researchers model the preference revision in different
ways. In particular, Aribarg, Arora, and Bodur (2002; henceforth AAB) models preference
revision by assuming that how much an individual affects another one depends on the
difference in their base preferences (i.e., zB0hg−z
A0
hg ), while Yang, Narayan and Assael (2006;
henceforth YNA) describes a revision process where the influence a member (e.g., member
A) has on another member (e.g., member B) depends on the other member’s (e.g., member
B’s) revised preference only (i.e., the preference interdependence of A only depends on
revised preference of B, zBhg).
However, these previous models of preference revision may not be applicable to our setting.
For example, per AAB (2002), the preference revision should depend on the difference be-
tween two member’s base preferences. AAB is more appropriate for a revision process
which takes place once (which is consistent with their setting), but not a revision process
taking place again and again. In this chapter, we follow but extend AAB (2002)’s idea in
two aspects. First of all, built on AAB (2002)’s idea of preference revision, we assume
that when household h is formed and two members cohabitate, there is a preference re-
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vision process in which household members influence and shift each other’s preferences
until preferences of both members reach an equilibirum/steady state. We argue that this
equilibirum state of revised preference is more suitable for our setting where household
members, who live with each other, have lots of opportunities to influence and shift other
members’ preferences. More importantly, households in our empirical application may
have formed a long time before we start to observe their behavior. The preference revision
process should have been completed and reach the equilibirum states.
Specifically, consider a process that member A and B affect each other depending on the
difference of their latest preferences. Note that, what AAB (2002) models is the first step
of the revision process where the latest preference is base preference. When the household
h is formed, household members influence each other again and again until an equilibrium
state is reached and the revised preferences are steady. In this case, the revision will depend
on the difference of their final revised preferences, i.e., zBhg− zAhg.
Second, unlike previous literature (e.g., AAB (2002)) which assumes that the outside option
does not change during the preference revision process, we incorporate a shift, δ , on the
outside option. By doing so, previous literature nests within our general model (the case
which previous literature models is equivalent to a case of δ=0 in our model). For example,
when member A and member B marry each other and form a household, they may have
more outside options than they were single. They may enjoy cooking together after they
formed a household, but cooking together was not a feasible outside option before they
cohabitated. Since we normalize the outside option as zero, this is equivalent to having
a shift in the preferences. In sum, per the two aspects discussed above, we describe the
revised preferences in the following way:
zAhg = z
A0
hg +δ
A
h +α
BA
h ·
(
zBhg− zAhg
)
(2.3)
zBhg = z
B0
hg +δ
B
h +α
AB
h ·
(
zAhg− zBhg
)
. (2.4)
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where the final states on the left-hand-side of the model equal to the revised states on the
right-hand-side. In this way, the preference revision will reach an equilibrium state11.
In the model above, we assume that preference revision consists of two parts: a shift and
influence from other household members. Specifically, for each individual, there is a per-
manent shift δ Ah (δ
B
h ), which, as mentioned above, takes into account possible changes of
outside options. So, this shift is homogeneous across all possible choices. In our setting,
for example, a negative shift δ Ah means that, after forming a group, member A has a lower
overall preference on watching TV, or equivalently, he or she becomes a person who likes
outside options more. For example, A may prefer having dinner instead of watching TV
with other household members.
The total influence from B to A depends on the degree of influence member B has on
member A (denoted as αBAh , and similarly, α
AB
h ) and the difference of the revised preference
between B and A (i.e.,
(
zBhg− zAhg
)
and
(
zAhg− zBhg
)
). The rationale behind is that, each
member, e.g., A, has two propensities, one is to stick to his or her original preference,
which is related to zAhg− zA0hg , the other is to be influenced by the other member B, which is
related to zBhg− zAhg. The revised preference will reach a steady state if the effect from these
two propensities equal to each other and reach an equilibrium. αBAh can be considered as
a ratio to balance these two propensities and it indicates how strong A is influenced by B,
compared with sticking to its original preferences.
In addition, we allow asymmetric coefficients of preference revision within household (i.e.,
αBAh can be different from α
AB
h ). For example, a large positive α
AB
h indicates that member
A influences B greatly, and member B’s preference become more similar to member A after
preference revision. While when αABh is close to 0 then member A’s latent preference has
11Note that this dynamic preference revision process is not modeled in this chapter because for our empir-
ical application, the group formation often took place a long time ago (outside the observation time window)
and preference revision has already reached a steady state. Even for the preference revision process which
takes place within the observation time window, household members can learn about each other’s revised
preference almost instantaneously. As a result, we assume the evolution process completes fairly quickly.
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a negligible influence on member B’s latent preference, leading to a result that member B
doesn’t revise his or her latent preference after the group is formed. Note that, we allow
αABh and α
BA
h to be less than 0 to capture the possibility of negative influence.
In summary, for a two-member household, member A’s and member B’s latent preferences
are represented as follows including base preference and preference revision (substituting
equations (2.1) and (2.2) to (2.3) and (2.4)):
zAhg = δ
A
h +
(
XAhg ·βg + vzA0hg
)
+αBAh ·
(
zBhg− zAhg
)
(2.5)
zBhg = δ
B
h +
(
XBhg ·βg + vzB0hg
)
+αABh ·
(
zAhg− zBhg
)
. (2.6)
where
(
vzA0hg ,v
zB0
hg
)
∼MV N [0,Σz].
In this model, we allow individual-specific preference revision coefficients and shifts. We
further assume that the heterogeneity in preference revision coefficients and shifts can be
decomposed as follows:
δ
A
h = X
A
h ·ζ δ + vδAh (2.7)
δ
B
h = X
B
h ·ζ δ + vδBh (2.8)
α
BA
h = X
A
h ·ζ α + vαBAh (2.9)
α
AB
h = X
B
h ·ζ α + vαABh (2.10)
where vδAh
(
vδBh
)
∼ N
(
0,σ2
δ
)
, vαBAh
(
vαABh
)
∼ N
(
0,σ2α
)
.
Note that XAh (X
B
h ) is a vector containing an intercept (the term “1”) and explanatory vari-
ables that could be either specific to member A (B), e.g., age, or common to both of them,
e.g., household income.
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2.2.2 Individual-level Utility for Joint Consumption
After household h is formed, a preference revision process completes and is irreversible.
From t = 1, individual household member’s utility for joint consumption in each period
depends on his/her revised latent preference, as well as temporal factors including behav-
ioral interaction, state-dependence, observed time-varying factors and unobserved random
shocks.
Consider the individual-level utilities for joint consumption for two members (i.e., member
A and member B). Member A consumes gA and member B consumes gB. The utility of
member A to consume gA consists of several parts. First of all, A’s intrinsic utility from
gA can be described by his or her revised preferences on it. Second, A’s utility for joint
consumption may also depend on other household member’s choices since there may be a
behavioral interaction which can play a significant role in determining member A′s utility.
For example, A may gain an extra utility to consume the same choice if A consumes with
B together, compared with the case when A consume alone. When gA=gB, member A and
member B consume the product together. Third, there may be some unobserved time-
specific factors, such as state-dependence, time-specific quality or price. Finally, there may
also be an unobserved random shock which captures the unknown random factors affecting
A’s utility on gA.
Specifically, the joint consumption utility includes five components, including 1) latent
preference after preference revision, 2) utility of behavioral interaction, 3) utility of state
dependence, 4) time-specific factors, and 5) random shocks. Denoting utility of member
A and member B in household h at time t as UAht
(
gA,gB
)
and UBht
(
gA,gB
)
respectively, we
have the following
UAht
(
gA,gB
)
= zAhgA + Iht ·θ
A
hgA +S
A
hgA,t−1 · τ
A
hgA +λ
A
h ·QgAt + εAhgAt (2.11)
UBht
(
gA,gB
)
= zBhgB + Iht ·θ
B
hgB +S
B
hgB,t−1 · τ
B
hgB +λ
B
h ·QgBt + εBhgBt (2.12)
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where
Iht =

1 i f gA = gB
0 otherwise
and
(
εAhgt ,ε
B
hgt
)
∼ MV N [0,Σε ] for any g; SAhgA,t−1 = 1 if member A in household h con-
sumes gA also at time t−1; otherwise, SAhgA,t−1 = 0. ε
A
hgAt is a random shock to member A
in household h on gA at time t. θ AhgA (θ
B
hgB ) and τ
A
hgA (τ
B
hgB ) describe behavioral interaction
and state-dependence for member A (B) respectively where Iht and SAhgA,t−1 are indicators
for these two components respectively. Q includes observable temporal factors, and λ Ah
describes A’s sensitivity to Q. Σε captures unobserved covariation of member A and mem-
ber B in unobserved random shocks. Note that, for identification, following most probit
models, we assume that the diagonal elements in Σε are 1. We further explain behavioral
interaction, state-dependence and time specific factors as follows.
The behavioral interaction we model here is fundamentally different from preference re-
vision as preference revision describes how a member’s utility is shifted for all occasions
and time by the difference of revised preferences between two members, while behavioral
interaction captures how a member’s utility depends on the other group member’s behavior
(e.g., choice g) on a given occasion (Yang et al. 2010). In particular, following previous lit-
erature (Hartmann 2010; Yang et al. 2010), we model behavioral interaction as Iht ·θ AhgA and
Iht · θ BhgB for member A and B respectively (as shown in the equations above). θ
A
hgA (θ
B
hgB)
is the utility member A (B) gains or loses by consuming together with the other member B
(A), capturing member A’s (B’s) tendency to consume the same choice with others. In case
both members choose the same choice g together, the behavioral interaction effect kicks in,
in this way, the utility of member A could depend on member B ’s choice gB. For example,
a husband (member A) and his wife (member B) may both enjoy watching Drama together
(i.e., θ Ah,drama > 0 and θ
B
h,drama > 0), or the wife enjoys watching Sports with her husband
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(θ Bh,sports > 0) but the husband does not (θ
A
h,sports < 0). Note that this utility from behavioral
interaction is in addition to members’ latent utility/preference, and is gained or lost only
when both members consume together (i.e., Iht = 1). Similar to preference revision, we
further examine the heterogeneity of θ Ahg and θ
B
hg by decomposing them as follows:
θ
A
hg = X
A
h ·ζ θg + vθAhg (2.13)
θ
B
hg = X
B
h ·ζ θg + vθBhg (2.14)
where vθmh ∼ N
(
0,σ2
θ
)
for m ∈ {A,B}.
With preference revision and behavioral interaction, we capture the intragroup interde-
pendence and interaction across members. Here we use state dependence to account for
dependence across time (Dube, Hitsch and Rossi 2010; Heckman 1991; Gupta, Chinta-
gunta and Wittink 1997). SAhgA,t−1 ( S
B
hgB,t−1 ) is an indicator variable to show whether A
(B) consumes the same choice in last and current periods. τAhgA and τ
B
hgB measure how the
consumption choices in a previous period affect household members’ current utilities. For
example, a household member could be more likely or less likely to continue watching a
drama if he/she already watched the drama in the last period. Again, similar to preference
revision and behavioral interaction, we further examine the heterogeneity of τAhg and τ
B
hg by
decomposing them as follows:
τ
A
hg = X
A
h ·ζ τg + vτAhg (2.15)
τ
B
hg = X
B
h ·ζ τg + vτBhg (2.16)
where vτmhg ∼ N
(
0,σ2τ
)
for m ∈ {A,B}.
We further assume that there are time-varying factors, Q, which affect individuals’ choices.
Thus, Q is time-specific and could also be choice-specific. For example, in the TV viewing
setting, an individual A may prefer the choice “drama” better when the number of available
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drama programs is higher. In this case, the number of available drama programs (similarly,
the number of available comedy programs and so on) is one of the time-varying factors.
The coefficients of the time-varying factors, λ Ah and λ
B
h , shows how sensitive individuals’
choices are to the time-varying factors. Once more, similar to preference revision, behav-
ioral interaction and state dependence, we further examine the heterogeneity of λ Ah and λ
B
h
by decomposing them as follows:
λ
A
h = X
A
h ·ζ λ + vλAh (2.17)
λ
B
h = X
B
h ·ζ λ + vλBh (2.18)
where vλmh ∼ N
(
0,σ2
λ
)
for m ∈ {A,B}.
2.2.3 Group Decision-Making Process
After setting up the individual-level utility for joint consumption, we examine how group
members make decisions together. A variety of different group decision-making mecha-
nisms have been studied by previous literature, which can be classified into two main cat-
egories: 1) cooperative or collective mechanisms, which predict that under certain sharing
rules members of a group will cooperate and reach Pareto-efficient intragroup allocations,
and 2) non-cooperative or strategic mechanisms, which predict that each member of a group
will act to maximize his or her own utility and the group will reach Nash equilibrium in
aggregate. In this chapter, we assume that each household member may have different in-
fluence (i.e., decision power) for joint consumption. To make a decision, each household
member follows a predefined decision-making mechanism to maximize either individual-
level or household-level utility. Here, we demonstrate how group decision-making mech-
anism can be incorporated into our model and how decision power may play a role in
the consumption process. With a probit model framework, one of the advantages of the
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proposed model is its flexibility to incorporate different forms of decision-making mecha-
nisms. Our framework can be easily extended to incorporate other decision mechanisms in
the future. In Appendix D, we discuss another decision-making mechanism, which we call
“Joint Optimization”; we also estimate the model with the joint-optimization mechanism
to show the ability of the proposed model to extend to other decision mechanisms.
In this chapter, we focus on a decision mechanism which we call “Winner Maximization.”
We assume there is a “winner” in each period where all members use the “Winner Op-
timization” decision mechanism. The winner has the priority to make the consumption
decision first over his or her partner. The rationale behind this mechanism is that individ-
uals try to maximize his or her own utility. The one who has higher weighted utility will
“win” and will be able to move first. Specifically, we have
Winner =

A i f γh ·UA∗ht > (1− γh) ·UB∗ht
B i f γh ·UA∗ht ≤ (1− γh) ·UB∗ht
(2.19)
where UA∗ht = max
(
UAht
)
and UB∗ht = max
(
UBht
)
are A and B’s maximum utilities at time t
over all feasible choices respectively; γh refers to the weight of member A’s utility, which
refers to decision power (of A) in this chapter; whereas 1− γh is the decision power of B.
Then the decision process follows a two-step sequential game where the winner moves first
followed by the other household members. In this case, there is one and only one subgame
perfect equilibrium in this sequential game. Therefore, one and only one consumption
decision can be reached following this decision mechanism. Specifically, in the case that A
is the winner, using backward induction, we have the following conditions for the subgame
perfect equilibrium
(
gA,gB
)
:
Condition A ≡

UAht
(
gA,gB
)
≥UAht
(
ĝA, ĝB
)
UBht
(
ĝA, ĝB
)
≥UBht
(
ĝA, g̃B
)
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where ĝA refers to the feasible consumption choices for A; whereas g̃B refers to any feasible
consumption choices of B given ĝA. The second condition means that B chooses his or her
best option ĝB given A’s move ĝA; while the first condition means that, considering B’s
response, A makes his or her decision to maximize his/her utility. Similarly, following the
process described above, we can have the conditions for the subgame perfect equilibrium
when B is the winner:
Condition B ≡

UBht
(
gA,gB
)
≥UBht
(
ĝA, ĝB
)
UAht
(
ĝA, ĝB
)
≥UAht
(
g̃A, ĝB
)
In summary, the probability of household members to choose a choice of
{
yAht = g
A,yBht = g
B}
is
p
{(
yAht = g
A,yBht = g
B)}
= p
{
γh ·UA∗ht > (1− γh) ·UB∗ht
⋂
UAht
(
gA,gB
)
≥UAht
(
ĝA, ĝB
)⋂
UBht
(
ĝA, ĝB
)
≥UBht
(
ĝA, g̃B
)}
+p
{
γh ·UA∗ht ≤ (1− γh) ·UB∗ht
⋂
UBht
(
gA,gB
)
≥UBht
(
ĝA, ĝB
)⋂
UAht
(
ĝA, ĝB
)
≥UAht
(
g̃A, ĝB
)}
(2.20)
where the first part on the right hand side is the probability when A is the winner whereas
the second part is that for B is the winner. Similar to Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel
(2013) and Cherchye, Rock and Vermeulen (2012), we further assume decision power of
member A in a two-member household h as follows
γh =
exp
([
XAh −XBh
]
·ψ + vγh
)
1+ exp
([
XAh −XBh
]
·ψ + vγh
) (2.21)
where vγh ∼ N
(
0,σ2γ
)
. Note that, ψ is not identified for X variables which are common to
both A and B, for example, household income, as in standard choice models.
In all, in this section, we propose a theory of joint consumption consisting of three parts.
First is the latent preference which includes base preference and a preference revision com-
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ponent to examine how individuals revise their preferences after forming a group. After
that, we model individual-level utility for joint consumption based on latent preferences
and several temporal factors including behavioral interaction, state dependence, observable
time-specific factors and unobservable random shock. Finally, we illustrate how a group
decision-making mechanism can be incorporated into our theory and investigate the effect
of decision power on group decisions.
2.2.4 A Single-Member Household
In Section 2.2.1 to Section 2.2.3, we describe a model for a two-member household. When
there is only one member in the household (i.e., a single-member household), we do not
have the three types of intragroup dynamics. Instead, we model its preference on choices,
state dependence and sensitivity to the time-varying factors. Specifically, since there is no
preference revision for single-member households, preference of a single-member house-
hold ĥ on a choice g can be considered as the same as his base preference, which can be
described following equations (2.1) and (2.2). Similarly, its state dependence can be de-
scribed following equations (2.15) and (2.16), whereas its sensitivity to the time-varying
factors can be described following equations (2.17) and (2.18). Particularly,
z1Pĥg = X
1P
ĥg ·βg + v
z1P
ĥg
(2.22)
τ
1P
ĥg = X
1P
ĥ ·ζ
τ
g + v
τ1P
ĥg (2.23)
λ
1P
ĥg = X
1P
ĥ ·ζ
λ
g + v
λ1P
ĥg (2.24)
where vz1P
ĥg
∼ N
(
0,σ2z
)
, vτ1P
ĥg
∼ N
(
0,σ2τ
)
, vλ1P
ĥg
∼ N
(
0,σ2
λ
)
; superscript “1P” stands for
single-member household.
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2.3 Model Estimation, Identification and Simulation
2.3.1 Model Estimation
We now discuss the estimation of our model using aggregate and de-identified data. Specif-
ically, we consider that only household-level data is available and the data may also be
de-identified, but we would like to estimate the model at the individual level to infer het-
erogeneous individual preference and intragroup dynamics. To achieve our estimation goal,
we generate individual-level data by imputing the missing information of who consumes
which choice. Our estimation process as stated involves two iterative Bayesian steps: first,
we use data augmentation to impute missing data about individual choice, and then we
estimate the model parameters using the individual-level choice data generated in the data
augmentation step.
Specifically, assume that at time t, members in household h consume
{
Y Aht = g
A,Y Bht = g
B}.
In summary, there are three possible cases of observed data. In the first case, we observe
that none of the choices are consumed, in this case, we can infer that
{
Y Aht = 0,Y
B
ht = 0
}
without any further imputation. Second, we may observe that one choice g is consumed.
This corresponds to three situations in individual-level consumption: either A consumes it
alone
{
Y Aht = g,Y
B
ht = 0
}
, or B consumes it alone
{
Y Aht = 0,Y
B
ht = g
}
, or A and B consume it
together
{
Y Aht = g,Y
B
ht = g
}
. This refers to the case of aggregate data where consumption
information of A and B are aggregate. Third, we may observe that two choices {g1,g2} are
consumed. This corresponds to two possible situations in individual-level consumption,
either A consumes g1 and B consumes g2
{
Y Aht = g1,Y
B
ht = g2
}
or the other way. This refers
to the de-identified data where we know that both A and B consume, but we cannot identify
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who consumes which one. We summarize the observed information, Y obsht as follows
Y obsht =
 g i f
{
Y Aht = g,Y
B
ht = g
}⋃{
Y Aht = g,Y
B
ht = 0
}⋃{
Y Aht = 0,Y
B
ht = g
}
{g1,g2} i f
{
Y Aht = g1,Y
B
ht = g2
}⋃{
Y Aht = g2,Y
B
ht = g1
} (2.25)
where g1 ·g2 · (g1−g2)> 0. A challenge to implement data augmentation for this model is
that there may be state dependence across periods. So, individual members’ choice at time
t (which is missing) depends on another missing information, the individuals’ consumption
choice at time t−1; and it could further rely on the missing information at time t−2 and
so on. Therefore, it is hard to compute or adequately sample the posterior distribution of
missing data. In this case, traditional data augmentation (e.g., Tanner and Wong 1987) is
not applicable.
To impute time-correlated missing individual-level information, we propose a forward-
backward augmentation algorithm as detailed in Appendix A, which incorporates the de-
pendence of time-correlated missing information and the uncertainty of estimated values
simultaneously. After the imputation step, we then have obtained an individual-level data
set which can be used for parameter estimation. In this chapter, we use a Bayesian MCMC
Gibbs sampling framework. Specifically, we draw unknown parameters one-by-one us-
ing Metropolis-Hastings steps conditional on all other parameters. Then we estimate the
heterogeneity structure on intragroup dynamics, state-dependence, and sensitivity across
households using regressions from the corresponding equations. A detailed description of
the parameter estimation process is provided in Appendix A.
2.3.2 Identification
In this chapter, two identification sources are used: one is the variation across time; the
other is the existence of single-member households. Specifically, there are two types of
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variation across time. First, available choice set changes over time: some choices may not
be available in certain periods (for example, in our TV viewing setting, some genres may
not be available in some periods); second, there could be time-varying factors which affect
individual’s choice decision (for instance, in our TV viewing setting again, the available
number of programs may change over time).
To illustrate our identification strategy, consider an example: TV viewing in a household
with two members, A and B. Although we don’t necessarily directly observe how member
A and member B behaved when they were single12, the information we learn from similar
single-member households13 (A′ and B′) can serve as the “reference points”. This informa-
tion helps us to have an idea about how member A and member B will respond to variation
across time in expectation. For example, imaging A is expected to be sensitive to time-
varying factors while B is not. We then observe how consumption at the aggregate level
responds to the variation across time to infer who is (are) watching. If we see that for a
given household, the household-level watching of a genre g is sensitive to the time-varying
factors, then it indicates that most genre g may be watched by A since A is sensitive to
time-varying factors while B is not. Similarly, across time, the available choice sets can be
different. Changes on available choice sets are important sources of variation which help
us identify who is (are) watching. For example, if A is more likely to switch to drama when
sports is not available, while B is more likely to switch to comedy. Then, observing at the
household level about what the household switches to (e.g., drama or comedy) when sports
is not available will provide us useful information about who is more likely to watch sports
in this household.
The identification sources discussed above provide us information about “who consumes
which” when only household-level data are available, enabling us to augment individual
12Note that our identification strategy does not rely on observing each member’s behavior before cohabi-
tation.
13Here, similar single-member households can be defined through various attributes, such as demographics,
geographics, consumption habits, etc.
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member’s choices from observed household-level data. Once individual-level data of all
choice decisions are augmented, we are able to identify individual’s revised preferences
and intragroup dynamics. For example, what genres member A usually watches when he or
she watches alone will help us pin down A’s revised preferences. The revised preferences,
together with the information learned from similar single-member households, further en-
able us to infer the component of preference revision, the shift and heterogeneity in prefer-
ences (through regression in equations (2.5) and (2.6)). Specifically, the difference between
the revised preferences and the expected preferences based on single-member households
will provide us information about how the individual revises his or her preference and how
he or she is affected by the other member in the same household. Behavior interaction of
a genre g is determined by how often the two household members watch genre g together.
For example, if A and B watch a little bit of drama when they watch TV alone, but they
watch a lot of drama when they watch TV together, it is likely that they have a high positive
behavioral interaction on watching drama together. Decision power is identified by what
genres are watched when A and B watch together. Specifically, it is identified by how the
consumption pattern is in line with A’s preference when A and B consume together. For
example, if A likes watching sports but dislikes drama, then a high decision power for A
will make it more likely for A and B to consume sports instead of drama when they watch
TV together. Please note that the identification of preference revision and decision power
rely on the viewing distribution across genres when people watch alone and watch together
respectively, so, for identification purposes, we assume that, for individuals, preference re-
vision and decision power are homogeneous across genres. If a member A has high decision
power on watching a genre g, we assume he/she will have the same decision power across
all genres. Table 2.1 below summarizes the main sources of identification and whether the
parameters are homogeneous across genres or genre-specific.
Our identification strategy can be seen from another perspective. Consider a household
with member A and B again. Based on their demographics and information learned from
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Table 2.1: Identification of Preference Heterogeneity and Group Dynamics
Watching alone Watching together
Homogeneous across genres Preference Revision and Shift Decision Power
Genre-specific Preference Heterogeneity Behavioral Interaction
similar single-member household members, we will be able to expect, from aggregate level
(i.e., household level) data, how the viewing behavior of this household will be if there is no
intragroup dynamics and preference heterogeneity. Then the difference between observed
aggregate level viewing behavior and the expected viewing behavior may come from any
one or more of the three types of group dynamics or preference heterogeneity. For exam-
ple, in a household, we see that the observed aggregate-level data has a higher viewing
of drama than expected. This may be because (assuming that we expect A likes drama
more according to similar single member households): (1) preference revision that B is
influenced by A and B becomes a person who likes drama more; (2) behavioral interac-
tion that A and B like watching drama together; (3) decision power that A has more power
to decide what to watch; or (4) A has a preference heterogeneity in drama that he or she
likes drama more than other similar single-member households. So the question is how we
can disentangle these three group dynamics as well as preference heterogeneity. Variation
across time provides us the information to separate these potentially confounded effects.
Specifically, these four factors, although they all can cause higher viewing of drama at the
household level, the effects of these components actually have different extents, shapes, or
different directions as long as time-varying factors change over time. For example, assume
that we may expect the effect to become stronger (i.e. bigger differences between observed
and expected viewing of drama) over time if it is due to decision power of A; while the
effect may remain relatively constant if it is due to preference heterogeneity. In this case,
by observing how the household-level viewing behavior changes over time along with the
variation from time-varying factors, we will be able to infer where (which factors) the ef-
fect comes from. In Appendix B, with several simulated examples, we show how variation
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across time helps us disentangle these three confounded intragroup dynamics as well as
preference heterogeneity.
Our identification idea is similar to some identification strategies in collective models in
family economics, where a central issue is how to infer individual preferences and intra-
household decision processes using individual’s labor supply and household-level con-
sumption data. Various methods have been used and discussed for identification of such
kind of models. For instance, Blundell et al. (2000) test and discuss how price variations
help the identification of collective models, by estimating price responses under different
price conditions (using aggregate consumption data). Another approach for identification
is to include single-member households where individual’s consumption behavior is ob-
served and ready to estimate individual preferences, and then use these estimates to further
identify the decision process in households with two or more members (Chiappori and
Donni 2009). In this chapter, we observe how consumption at the aggregate level responds
to changes in the choice sets (e.g., one or more choices are not available) and the time-
varying factors to infer individual preferences and intragroup dyamics. This is similar to
the idea of utilizing price variations as a source of identification for collective models, in
the sense that both approaches observe changes of aggregated consumption behavior due
to variation in variables which affect individuals’ consumption decisions.
2.3.3 Parameter Recovery and Model Comparisons Using Simulation
Studies
We test and show the empirical identification of our individual-level model using household-
level data in simulation studies. In the simulation, we generate a data set consisting of 120
households (80 two-member households and 40 single-member households), with three
covariate variables, four available choices and 500 periods. All parameters and explana-
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tory variables are randomly drawn from normal distributions or multivariate normal dis-
tributions. Specifically, the first covariate variable is for intercept estimation, so the first
covariate variable is 1. The second and third covariates are randomly drawn from a normal
distribution with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 0.5. We then simulate parameters
so that we can have a setting close to the empirical data set. For example, the estimation
results of empirical data set have an estimated z mostly between -2 and -3; correspondingly,
in the simulation, we draw β s from a normal distribution with mean of -2 and standard de-
viation of 0.2 to generate the similar scale of z in the simulation. Following the same logic,
we draw ζα , ζγ , ζθ , ζτ , ζλ , ζδ from normal distributions with mean of 0.3, 0.2, 1.0, 1.0,
0.5, -0.5 respectively (and standard deviation of 0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.1, 0.1 respectively).
We then aggregate the viewing data into the household level and estimate the model using
aggregated viewing data only. We first show that the full model (Model 1) is able to recover
simulated parameters. To show the biases caused by ignoring group dynamics, we further
compare the full model (Model 1) which includes all three components of intragroup dy-
namics with the following four models: a model without preference revision (Model 2),
a model where all individuals have the same decision power (Model 3), a model without
behavioral interaction (Model 4), and a model without any intragroup dynamics (Model 5).
Table 2.2 summarizes the parameter estimation results, where the second column is the
true values that the simulation is based on, followed by five columns for estimation results
of the five models respectively. For each model, we run two chains of MCMC, each for
20,000 iterations and the first 10,000 iterations are discarded by trace plots and Gelman-
Rubin diagnostics (Gelman and Rubin 1992). The MCMC chains are thinned to remove
autocorrelation between draws and every 50th draw is used for the subsequent analysis.
For each parameter, we present the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of its
kept MCMC iterations. For parameters which are genre-specific, each of them is a 3*4
matrix (three covariates and four choices); for parameters which are not genre-specific,
each of them is a 3*1 matrix. For example, β [1,2] is the intercept term for choice 2. From
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Table 2.2: Estimation Results of Five Models in Simulation
Parameter TRUE Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
β [1,1] -2.19 -2.27(0.07) -2.67(0.04) -2.32(0.03) -2.3(0.03) -2.37(0.04)
β [1,2] -2.05 -2.00(0.09) -2.40(0.02) -2.11(0.05) -1.91(0.03) -1.89(0.04)
β [1,3] -2.35 -2.41(0.09) -2.71(0.03) -2.47(0.03) -2.3(0.04) -2.32(0.03)
β [1,4] -2.34 -2.37(0.08) -2.82(0.03) -2.4(0.04) -2.35(0.04) -2.38(0.03)
β [2,1] -1.79 -1.61(0.14) -2.19(0.07) -1.60(0.09) -1.94(0.09) -1.76(0.19)
β [2,2] -2.12 -2.03(0.09) -2.50(0.04) -1.98(0.06) -2.41(0.08) -1.92(0.08)
β [2,3] -2.36 -2.27(0.08) -2.68(0.09) -2.19(0.06) -2.56(0.08) -1.98(0.08)
β [2,4] -2.03 -1.82(0.11) -2.34(0.06) -1.66(0.09) -2.12(0.07) -1.85(0.06)
β [3,1] -1.77 -1.70(0.13) -2.20(0.08) -1.84(0.09) -2.19(0.10) -1.9(0.07)
β [3,2] -1.81 -1.71(0.11) -2.09(0.07) -1.77(0.09) -2.11(0.06) -1.67(0.05)
β [3,3] -1.88 -1.92(0.08) -2.14(0.1) -2.00(0.1) -2.27(0.1) -1.89(0.05)
β [3,4] -1.77 -1.77(0.09) -2.30(0.05) -1.78(0.08) -2.23(0.09) -1.76(0.07)
ζα [1,1] 0.27 0.22(0.04) 0.32(0.03) 0.45(0.03)
ζα [2,1] 0.32 0.25(0.06) 0.38(0.06) 0.41(0.06)
ζα [3,1] 0.26 0.17(0.06) 0.23(0.04) 0.26(0.03)
ζγ [2,1] 0.16 0.26(0.21) -0.03(0.22) -0.58(0.18)
ζγ [3,1] 0.17 0.11(0.16) 0.03(0.15) -0.44(0.17)
ζθ [1,1] 0.57 0.74(0.06) 0.77(0.04) 0.53(0.05)
ζθ [1,2] 1.14 1.06(0.07) 1.01(0.04) 1.04(0.06)
ζθ [1,3] 0.84 0.86(0.09) 0.78(0.05) 0.83(0.05)
ζθ [1,4] 0.62 0.93(0.09) 0.92(0.05) 0.87(0.06)
ζθ [2,1] 0.97 1.06(0.1) 0.81(0.1) 0.64(0.16)
ζθ [2,2] 0.82 0.90(0.12) 0.68(0.08) 0.54(0.09)
ζθ [2,3] 0.99 0.87(0.13) 0.75(0.06) 0.91(0.09)
ζθ [2,4] 1.22 1.31(0.13) 0.42(0.14) 0.65(0.09)
ζθ [3,1] 1.26 1.2(0.12) 1.15(0.12) 0.75(0.11)
ζθ [3,2] 0.69 0.86(0.10) 0.73(0.08) 0.4(0.11)
ζθ [3,3] 1.18 1.07(0.11) 0.91(0.18) 1.25(0.11)
ζθ [3,4] 1.02 0.77(0.15) 1.13(0.11) 1.29(0.1)
ζλ [1,1] 0.36 0.39(0.04) 0.4(0.04) 0.38(0.03) 0.41(0.04) 0.33(0.02)
ζλ [2,1] 0.48 0.50(0.07) 0.53(0.07) 0.53(0.05) 0.50(0.06) 0.41(0.06)
ζλ [3,1] 0.60 0.68(0.06) 0.76(0.07) 0.61(0.05) 0.70(0.06) 0.67(0.06)
ζτ [1,1] 1.04 0.99(0.06) 1.04(0.08) 1.13(0.07) 0.95(0.06) 1.01(0.07)
ζτ [1,2] 0.86 0.96(0.05) 0.90(0.03) 0.94(0.04) 0.98(0.03) 0.95(0.05)
ζτ [1,3] 1.25 1.25(0.06) 1.14(0.04) 1.28(0.05) 1.32(0.03) 1.36(0.03)
ζτ [1,4] 1.07 0.98(0.05) 0.87(0.05) 0.85(0.04) 0.97(0.04) 1.03(0.04)
ζτ [2,1] 1.10 1.15(0.1) 1.15(0.09) 1.4(0.1) 1.16(0.1) 1.3(0.08)
ζτ [2,2] 0.91 0.94(0.12) 0.83(0.1) 0.86(0.14) 0.9(0.08) 1.05(0.07)
ζτ [2,3] 0.82 0.7(0.1) 0.67(0.06) 0.78(0.09) 0.78(0.12) 0.82(0.08)
ζτ [2,4] 0.89 0.71(0.09) 0.56(0.07) 0.58(0.08) 0.78(0.07) 1.03(0.11)
ζτ [3,1] 0.96 1.07(0.12) 1.2(0.07) 1.01(0.18) 0.91(0.11) 0.99(0.06)
ζτ [3,2] 0.97 1.08(0.21) 0.92(0.09) 0.97(0.09) 0.96(0.17) 0.92(0.06)
ζτ [3,3] 0.83 0.94(0.09) 0.64(0.08) 0.94(0.1) 1.01(0.11) 1.09(0.07)
ζτ [3,4] 1.04 1.05(0.1) 1.01(0.11) 0.94(0.09) 1.24(0.09) 1.18(0.09)
ζδ [1,1] -0.52 -0.62(0.05) -0.58(0.03) -0.44(0.03)
ζδ [2,1] -0.59 -0.89(0.16) -0.89(0.06) -0.15(0.07)
ζδ [3,1] -0.44 -0.60(0.12) -0.28(0.07) 0.00(0.07)
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Table 2.2, we show that, first of all, the full model can recover the simulated parameters
in the sense that almost all (45 out of 47) estimated parameter values are not significantly
different from their corresponding simulated true values at a significance level of 0.05, with
2 parameters slightly deviating from true values. Second, comparing results in Model 2 to
Model 5 with the true parameters, we show that ignoring any one of the group dynamics
may cause biases on the estimation results. In Model 2 to Model 5, there are 24 out of
41 parameters, 19 out of 45 parameters, 18 out of 35 parameters, 10 out of 27 parameters
respectively having true values out of the 95% posterior interval.
For example, in Model 2 where we ignore the preference revision, there are biases on es-
timating individual preferences and other group dynamics. In this simulation study, we
assume an overall negative preference shift (i.e. δ ) in the preference revision process. Ig-
noring preference revision process will ignore such a negative shift from single-member
households to two-member households and thus downwardly bias the estimation of inter-
cept terms in β (as shown in Table 2.2). In Model 3, where we assume that individuals
have the same decision power, there are also biases on estimating preferences. In house-
holds where member A is simulated to have decision power higher than 0.5 (that is A has
more power than B to decide what to watch), ignoring decision power in the estimation
process would pull upward the estimated preferences for all genres of member A. In Model
4, where we ignore the behavioral interaction, we have bias on preference estimation as
well as preference revision and decision power estimation. Note that ignoring behavioral
interaction will distort the augmentation directly about whether household members watch
TV together. In this simulation study, we simulate the overall positive behavioral interac-
tion between A and B. Ignoring such kind of behavioral interaction will downwardly bias
the number of times that A and B watch together and upward bias the number of times they
watch alone. Since some cases where A and B watching together are incorrectly inferred
as A or B watching alone, A and B would be estimated to be similar to each other (more
than it should be), which upward biases the estimation of preference revision. Similar to
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Model 2 to Model 4, Model 5 which ignores all three group dynamics also has estimation
biases on preferences.
2.4 Empirical Application: Household TV Viewing and
Targeted TV Advertising
In this section, we apply the proposed model to the setting of television viewing and tar-
geted advertising on Nielsen People Meter (NPM) data. Each subject in NPM panel presses
his or her unique meter whenever he or she watches TV. The NPM data contains individual-
level viewing data which reports when and what each household member watched on TV,
as well as household and person classification data. But before we estimate our model, we
first aggregate the TV viewing behavior to the household level to generate another data set
which is similar to the set-top box data. We call it as the aggregate and “de-identified” NPM
data. Then, we take no notice of intra-household individuals’ TV viewing behavior and es-
timate our model using the aggregate and “de-identified” NPM data. In short, although we
use an individual-level data set, the individual-level viewing data are used only for model
validation and discussion. We illustrate how to estimate the proposed model using aggre-
gated and de-identified data, and further demonstrate the importance to incorporate group
dynamics.
2.4.1 Data Description
The NPM data set consists of two parts: one is TV viewing data, and the other is house-
hold and person classification data. Each TV viewing record contains information about
who (which household member) watches what TV program at what time. Household and
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person classification data describe characteristics of households and individuals, includ-
ing household size, household income, whether there is cable in the household, whether
the household has internet, geographic location, as well as individual-level demographics
including age, gender, education and working hours each week.
In this chapter, following previous studies, we focus on TV viewing behavior in prime
time of weekdays (i.e., Monday to Friday 8:00 PM to 11:00 PM) for 1,204 households
in 24 weeks. Our sample includes 411 single-member households and 793 two-member
households. Specifically, we focus on households which have one or two members, no
child and no cable in the household. We do not include households with cable because, in
the NPM data set, we do not have information about these households’ cable subscription
and thus do not know available choices they have, an important source of identification.
Nielsen assigns each program to a genre. There are 22 genres defined by Nielsen in the
NPM data set. Table 2.3 shows the top six genres by household viewing frequencies.
Household viewing frequency of a genre is the percentage of household views on this genre.
As displayed in Table 3, first, the top six genres contains over 95% of household viewing.
Second, as shown in Table 3, there is large heterogeneity among genres. The top genre,
General Drama, has a viewing percentage of over 35%, while Sports has less than 6%. In
summary, households focus and spend most of their watching time on a few genres instead
of evenly spending it across genres.
Table 2.3: Viewing of Genres
Genre Percentage of Viewing Availability
Comedy 9.4% 41.7%
News Documentary 8.4% 21.1%
General Drama 35.4% 100.0%
General Variety 6.2% 34.7%
Participation Variety 31.0% 69.3%
Sports 5.7% 12.6%
Others 3.9% 21.0%
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In this chapter, we focus our analysis on the top six genres, including general drama (GD),
participation variety (PV), situation comedy (CS), general variety (GV), sports event (SE),
and news documentary (DN), with all other genres coded as “others” (Os). We show in
Table 2.3 (column “Availability”) the availability of each genre over time. For example,
SE is available about 12% of the time. Most genres (except Drama) are not available in
some periods respectively, which creates 37 different choice sets over time. In addition, we
use the number of available programs for each genre as a time-varying factor, in the sense
that, for example, a higher number of available programs for drama may lead more people
watch it.
Some exploratory analyses and basic statistics indicate the possibility of intragroup dynam-
ics in this data set. For example, there is a significant difference between the total time spent
on TV for individuals in single-member households and those in two-member households.
Table 2.4 summarizes the average time each of the following groups spent on each genre as
well as their total time on TV: females and males in two-member households, and females
and males in single-member households. For example, females in two-member house-
holds spent about 22% of their time on TV on average, while females in single-member
households spent about 33% of their time on TV. The less time on TV for individuals in
two-member households, compared with those in single-member households, may be due
to the more attractive outside options for two-member households, and corresponds to the
preference shift, δ , in our model.
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Table 2.4: TV Viewing Frequency
Two-member HH Single-member HH
Genre Females Males Females Males
Comedy 2.1% 1.8% 2.8% 2.5%
News Documentary 1.9% 1.3% 3.3% 2.0%
General Drama 7.7% 6.5% 11.0% 10.0%
General Variety 1.4% 1.1% 1.9% 1.5%
Participation Variety 7.1% 5.4% 11.3% 6.6%
Sports 1.0% 1.5% 1.0% 1.8%
Others 0.8% 0.7% 1.3% 1.0%
total 22.0% 18.2% 32.7% 25.3%
To check whether there is a possible effect of preference revision in an exploratory way, we
take females as an example. First, we calculate the ratio of viewing frequency of females in
two-member households over that of females in single-member households for each genre,
which is presented by the solid line in Figure 2.1. This gives us a proxy of preference
revision (from single-member females to two-member females). Per our model, we expect
this kind of revision to be related to the differences in revised preferences of two members
in the two-member households. Since 90% of the two-member households consist of one
male and one female, we look into the ratio of viewing frequency of males in two-member
households over that for females in two-member households (as presented in the dashed
line in Figure 2.1), using it as a way to explore the differences in revised preferences. As
shown in Figure 2.1, these two lines are highly corrected with each other, as our model
predicts that preference revision depends on the differences in revised preferences.
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Figure 2.1: Possible Preference Revision for Females vs. Differences Between Males and
Females
We also see possible effects of behavioral interaction in two-member households. In two-
member households, members spend a lot of time watching TV together. Table 2.5 sum-
marizes the percentage of times watching together versus watching alone in two-member
households on each genre. For example, for every 100 times of viewing Comedy (from the
household level), about 53 of them are watched by a household member alone while the
other 47 are watched by two members together. As shown in Table 2.5, over 40% of the
viewing time members in two-member households watch TV together. Without behavioral
interaction, it is difficult to explain such a high percentage of viewing time that household
members watch TV together.
Table 2.5: Watching Together vs. Watching Alone in Two-Member Households
CS DN GD GV PV SE Os
Watching alone 53.4% 58.5% 55.3% 57.2% 56.3% 61.0% 60.9%
Watching together 46.6% 41.5% 44.7% 42.8% 43.7% 39.0% 39.1%
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2.4.2 Estimation Results
We now report the estimation results based on the Nielsen People Meter (NPM) data. In
the estimation, we incorporate the following demographics information as explanatory
variables: three household-level demographics (including household income, size of ge-
ographic location (whether it is in a big city), whether the household consist of a married
couple) and six individual-level demographics (including gender, age, education level, time
spent on the internet, working hours per week, whether the individual is a household head).
We further use the number of available programs for each genre at each period as a time-
varying factor. We first aggregate the TV viewing data into household level and pretend
that only household-level data are available. We run two chains of MCMC for the estima-
tion, each for 20,000 iterations and the first 10,000 iterations are discarded on the basis of
trace plots and Gelman-Rubin diagnostics. We further thin the MCMC chains and kept ev-
ery 50th draw to remove autocorrelation between draws. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 summarize the
heterogeneity in preferences, intragroup dynamics and state dependence, where we present
the mean and standard deviation of central prior distributed parameters across all individ-
uals. For example, the preference revision across all individuals has a mean of 0.33 and
standard deviation of 0.06. We also show the distribution of the heterogeneity in Appendix
C using Figures C.1 to C.7.
First, overall, there is evidence of positive preference revision and behavioral interaction
among household members. That is, on average, household members positively affect each
other’s preferences on TV genres (thus revise their preferences toward each other) and
enjoy watching TV together. Furthermore, there is a negative shift from single-member
household to two-member households overall. Household members in two-member house-
holds may enjoy more from outside options such as shopping together and thus have a
negative shift of watching TV at home.
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Table 2.6: Heterogeneity Across Members in Two-Member Households
Preference Revision Preference Shift Decision Power Sensitivity
mean 0.33 -0.62 0.50 0.80
St.dev. 0.06 0.18 0.04 0.29
Table 2.7: Genre-Specific Heterogeneity Across Members in Two-Member Households
CS DN GD GV PV SE Others
Behavioral Interaction
mean 0.73 0.77 0.85 0.63 0.88 0.57 0.73
St.dev. 0.77 0.77 0.66 0.76 0.71 0.82 0.82
State Dependence
mean 1.71 2.51 1.69 2.08 1.84 2.44 2.20
St.dev. 0.82 0.72 0.50 0.68 0.55 0.73 0.69
Revised Preferences
mean -2.83 -2.81 -2.28 -2.91 -2.39 -2.71 -2.92
St.dev. 0.48 0.42 0.47 0.42 0.40 0.35 0.34
Second, the heterogeneity across households emphasizes the importance to incorporate and
examine intragroup dynamics. Moreover, it has some important managerial implications.
Take behavioral interaction as an example. It could be more effective to air ads of family
products (e.g., furniture, traveling, etc.) for households with strong and positive behav-
ioral interaction since their household members are more likely to watch TV together. That
is, the model allows us to examine intragroup dynamics with heterogeneity across house-
holds, which provides us the opportunity to make better-customized marketing strategies,
demonstrated later in this chapter.
Third, we find strong state dependence for all genres. Results in Table 2.7 suggest that
there is heterogeneity in state-dependence across household members for each of the seven
genres, and Figures C.3 and C.4 in Appendix C shows that almost all household members
have strong and positive state dependence for each genre. Therefore, household members
are inclined to continue watching the same genres across time. First, this provides insights
into the design of TV program schedule. For example, offering TV programs of the same
genre consecutively could be desirable to take advantage of the effect of state dependence,
thus keeping audiences staying with TV. The strong state dependence may explain why
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more and more TV channels focus on one genre (to lock in and keep audiences watching).
We also find strong sensitivity to the number of available programs. This may also provide
some implications into the design of TV program schedule.
Table C.1 to Table C.4 in Appendix C summarize the estimation results of the effect of
covariates on preferences, intragroup dynamics, state dependence, and sensitivity. From
these, we can infer some relationships between modeled parameters and demographics.
For example, estimation results show that, in general, higher income, higher education
level and lower working hours are associated with less time on TV. Males watch more
sports while females watch more PV. Higher income is associated with less behavioral
interaction in GV and higher behavioral interaction in Sports. People in large cities are
associated with high interaction in News. Older people are associated with high behavioral
interaction in most genres. Household heads are associated with less interaction in News.
Higher income and younger people are associated with higher state dependence.
Based on the estimation results, we examine how well the proposed model is able to identify
who is (are) watching. Each time we observe a TV viewing from a two-member household,
for each of the two members, we predict whether he/she watches the TV. So, each time,
there are two conditions: a true condition which is the truth about whether a household
member watches the TV from the NPM data, and a predicted condition which refers to the
prediction based on the modeling results. Table 2.8 below illustrates a contingency table
to examine how well the model can identify who is (are) watching. Specifically, there are
four areas in the table, which stands for four different cases. For example, true positive (TP)
refers to the case that people watch the TV, and our prediction correctly says they watch
TV. We then look into two metrics to examine the performance of the proposed model.
One is positive predictive value (PPV), which is the proportion of true watch out of all
predicted watch (i.e., PPV= TP / (TP+FP)); the other is true positive rate (TPR) which is
the proportion of true watch that are that correctly predicted (i.e., TPR=TP/(TP+FN)). We
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Table 2.8: An Illustration Example of a Contingency Table
True Condition
Watch Not-Watch
Predicted Condition
Watch True Positive (TP) False Positive (FP)
Not-Watch False Negative (FN) True Negative (TN)
focus on these two metrics because these two are more relevant for marketing practice (such
as ad targeting) than other metrics such as false positive rate. In particular, both of these fit
metrics are important for inferring TV watching. For example, in TV ad targeting, a high
positive predictive value means that most ad impressions sent out correctly reach targets
(i.e. correctly infer targets are watching most time), which reduces the direct ad cost to
reach targets; while a high true positive rate means that most people who are watching TV
are correctly found/detected, which means a low opportunity cost. If the true positive rate
is low, then we will miss some targets who are watching TV, which loses the opportunity
to reach them, resulting in a high opportunity cost.
In our estimation, we randomly divided all households into two groups; one is an in-sample
group to run estimation, the other is an external-sample group to test and validate our es-
timation results. Figure 2.2 summarizes the distribution of positive predictive value and
true positive rate across all two-member households for both in-sample and external sam-
ple. The overall positive predictive value and true positive rate are around 75% and 68%
respectively for the in-sample group. The external sample has comparable results, with
72% and 65% for the overall positive predictive value and true positive rate respectively.
As shown in Figure 2.2, the proposed model has a very high positive predictive value for
most households (e.g., in some households, the positive predictive value is as high as more
than 90%). This is particularly important for TV ad targeting, in the sense that it enables us
to focus on those households with high positive predictive value (i.e., so we can correctly
infer who is watching) to target the desired audience efficiently. Note that some households
have lower positive predictive value and true positive rate; these households usually have
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sparse data, and it is difficult to make inference about individuals’ watching behavior.
Figure 2.2: Distribution of Positive Predictive Value and True Positive Rate across Two-
Member Households
2.4.3 Model Comparisons and Targeted TV Advertising Campaign
We compare the proposed model with the four benchmark models: each of first three mod-
els turns off one type of group dynamics (preference revision, behavioral interaction and
decision power) respectively to see the consequence of ignoring each of these three group
dynamics; the fourth benchmark model is a model without any of the three intragroup dy-
namics. We first compare the full model with the first four benchmark models in terms of
DIC which has been widely used in Bayesian models as a model selection criteria. Table
2.9 summarizes the DIC for these five models. It is clear that the full model has lower
DIC than benchmark models, indicating that the full model outperforms the other models
in term of model fit.
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Table 2.9: DIC of Five Models
DIC
Full Model 571438
w/o Preference Revision 571941
w/o Decision Power 572646
w/o Behavioral Interaction 575351
w/o any group dynamics 580590
We then conduct a counterfactual analysis on TV targeting using the NPM data set based on
the estimated results. Specifically, imaging that a TV advertiser wants to target particular
types of audiences, for example, males with ages ranging from 31 to 50. Further assume
that household members’ demographics information is available and observed, so that the
TV advertiser is aware of the households that contain 31 to 50-year-old male members.
We call these households as “targeted households” and 31 to 50-year-old male members as
“targeted audiences.” Specifically, we pretend that we do not have individual-level data and
only observe household-level viewing data. In this case, once a TV viewing from a targeted
household is observed, the TV advertiser decides whether to air its ads or not. Note that,
these households may contain household members who are not targeted (e.g., the wives in
these households).
To compare the proposed model with the benchmark models, we run a counterfactual ex-
periment on targeting 31 to 50 years old males. Specifically, assume that an advertiser
would like to have a certain amount of exposures from targeted audiences (i.e., 31 to 50
years old males), where an exposure (EX) is counted each time the ad is exposed to a target
audience. Note that, some targeted households may consist of two targeted audiences. In
these households, if both members are watching TV while the ad is aired, then it is counted
as two exposures. To save advertising cost, the advertiser tries to reach its goal of exposures
from targeted audiences by airing its ad as few times as possible. To do so, the advertiser
needs to infer how likely that the targeted audience(s) in the household is (are) watching
TV once a TV viewing from a targeted household is observed. It then sends its ad (an im-
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pression) to households where the ad would be most likely watched by a target. Then the
cost of the advertiser can be measured by the ratio of impressions over exposures, which
describes the number of impressions needed to get an exposure to the targeted audiences.
The lower the ratio, the lower the cost, and thus the more efficient it is to target.
We look into two different scenarios. In one scenario, the advertiser would like to reach
2,000 exposures whereas in the second scenarios the advertiser would like to reach 3,000
exposures. We examine the expected number of impressions needed by each model in
each of the two scenarios, comparing with randomly sending out the ad to targeted house-
holds. First, we find that the proposed full model is able to improve the efficiency to reach
targeted audiences. For example, for the in-sample data set, the average impression-to-
exposure ratio is around 1.82 if we randomly send out the ad to targeted households. That
is, for 2000 exposures and 3000 exposures, we expect to need about 3640 and 5460 im-
pressions respectively. The proposed full model can reach the same exposures with much
fewer impressions (i.e., 2027 and 3547 impressions respectively). Table 2.10 displays the
expected reduction in impression with each model comparing with sending out ads ran-
domly to targeted households. Second, the proposed full model also outperforms reduced
models where one or more group dynamics are ignored. For example, to reach 2,000 expo-
sures to the targeted audiences, the proposed model needs only 2027 impressions while the
model without group dynamics needs 2528 impressions which is 35% higher. Moreover,
the impression-exposure ratio is lower when the number of exposures is smaller. Specifi-
cally, for the proposed full model, to reach 2,000 exposures, the impression-exposure ratio
is about 1.01 while the ratio is about 1.18 to reach 3,000 exposures. This indicates that the
proposed model is able to correctly find out households which are more likely to watch.
So with fewer exposures, the model will focus more on targeted audiences who are more
likely to watch.
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Table 2.10: Expected Reduction in Impressions Needed
In-Sample Out-of-Sample
2,000
Exposures
3,000
Exposures
2,000
Exposures
3,000
Exposures
Full Model 44.3% 35.0% 33.0% 30.3%
w/o Preference Revision 43.7% 34.9% 27.6% 24.2%
w/o Decision Power 41.4% 32.6% 32.5% 29.5%
w/o Behavioral Interaction 35.6% 21.1% 29.9% 27.4%
w/o any group dynamics 30.5% 16.8% 27.4% 26.8%
2.5 Discussion and Potential Future Extensions
In this section, we discuss future extensions to the model and research. First, there are
other strategies which may help us identify the proposed model. We briefly discuss some
of them below, including (1) time-varying covariates for consumers, (2) survey data, (3)
auxiliary aggregate data, and (4) exclusion consumption. Incorporating these identifica-
tion strategies may help us identify the proposed model better. Second, the current study
looks into two-member households. In the future, we may extend the proposed model to
groups/households with three or more than three members.
2.5.1 Other Identification Strategies
First, there are two types of time-varying covariates: one is covariates for the consumption
goods; the other is covariates for household members. The first category is discussed and
incorporated in this chapter. The second category includes variables describing the changes
of household members across time. For example, suppose we have a variable describing
the available leisure time for each household member each period. Undoubtedly, such
time-varying covariates could help model identification by providing variation over time
and examining how consumption choices change correspondingly. Another example is
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a variable indicating whether household members are available for watching TV in each
period. Then, say in some periods, if only one household member has time for watching
TV, we will be able to observe the consumption of this member in these periods, which
enables us to identify the preferences of this household member well akin to the variation
currently provided by single-member households.
For instance, marketers constantly collect survey data to understand the genre viewing
habits of households. For example, a survey on, if a genre g is watched, what is the prob-
ability that it is watched by member A or B, or A and B together. Suppose such data for
each genre is available, we then have a prior distribution Fg of, when a genre g is watched,
what is the probability that it is watched by A, B and A and B together respectively. We
then can implement a method which is similar to the Information Reweighted Prior (IRP)
method proposed by Wang (2012), except that we incorporate it with the data augmentation
method.
Another possible external data source is aggregate TV viewing data which contains infor-
mation about what percent of individuals watch genre g at time t. Existing TV rating data
may be feasible if it contains information for each genre (instead of specific programs).
Assuming that we have a data set which includes the following aggregate information: the
percentage that member As (Bs) watch genre g at time t, denoted as πAgt (π
B
gt). We can then
use this information as a constraint to facilitate the data augmentation process (as shown in
Chen and Yang 2007; Musalem, Bradlow and Raju 2008):
∑
h
yAhgt = H ·πAgt (2.26)
∑
h
yBhgt = H ·πBgt (2.27)
where yihgt = 1 if individual i in household h watching genre g at time t according to aug-
mented data.
53
Finally, an approach that has been used to identify the collective models is to have an ex-
clusion assumption that each household member does not consume at least one good. For
example, in a two-member household, member A never watches drama, and member B
never watches Sports. Chiappori and Ekeland (2009) show that such an exclusion assump-
tion can guarantee generic identifiability of the collective models. Our proposed model is
surely different from collective models, but this identification strategy can shed some light
on improving identification of the proposed model. If member A never watches drama, we
would know that all drama viewing is from member B alone. Similarly, if member B never
watches Sports, we would know all Sports viewing is from A alone. This information pro-
vides us individual-level data on some choices, which reduces our uncertainty in the data
augmentation and improves the identification of the proposed model.
2.5.2 More than Two Group Members
Another possible extension is to have more than two members in the households. We
develop our model assuming that there are two group members. The model proposed can
easily be extended to incorporate more than two group members. When there are more
than two group members, the model development process is similar to what we present,
except that it will need to incorporate more parameters due to the model complexity. We
start our discussion with the three intragroup dynamics. First, the preference revision can
be generalized as
zihg = X
i
h ·β
i
g +δ
i
h + ∑
i′ 6=i
(
zi
′
hg− z
i
hg
)
·α i,i
′
h + v
i
hg (2.28)
where α i,i
′
h measures the influence of group member i
′ to member i; whereas δ ih is the
preference shift for member i; If we allow asymmetric preference interdependence then
α
i,i′
h 6= α
i′,i
h . Second, the behavioral interaction can be generalized as ∑i′ 6=i θ
i,i′
hg · I
i,i′where
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θ i.i
′
hg measures the behavioral interaction between group member i
′ and member i. Third,
decision power of member i is γ ih where ∑i γ
i
h = 1. Model components other than group
dynamics can then be easily extended to the case of more than two group members. For
example, each household member may have its own state dependence term for each choice.
2.6 Conclusion
When there is a lack of rich individual-level data, we only observe choices at the group
level and therefore lack important information about individuals’ behavior. For decades,
it presented a great barrier and a central issue which hinders marketers to underpin new
waves of marketing innovations (e.g., personalization). To solve this issue, we propose a
new model and a novel algorithm to infer individual preferences and intragroup dynamics
using just commonly available aggregate and de-identified data. Even if only aggregate and
de-identified data are available, marketers can apply our method to estimate an individual-
level model with aggregate and de-identified data. With our method, marketers can better
understand who actually consumes the products, and how individuals within a group inter-
act and influence each other.
In particular, we propose a joint consumption theory which focuses on three important
components of intragroup dynamics (i.e., preference revision, behavioral interaction, and
decision power). We show that we can disentangle these three components apart in our
setting without observing individual-level data. The model is estimated with just aggre-
gate and de-identified data in two iterative Bayesian steps: first, we use data augmentation
to impute missing data about individual choices, and then we estimate the model param-
eters using the individual-level choice data generated. To impute time-correlated missing
individual-level information based on the aggregate and de-identified data, we propose a
forward-backward augmentation algorithm, which incorporates the dependence of time-
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correlated missing information and the uncertainty of estimated values simultaneously.
In this chapter, we offer a new identification strategy by leveraging cross-sectional and
longitudinal variation to identify heterogeneous individual preferences and different com-
ponents of intragroup dynamics. We identify the proposed model with aggregate and de-
identified data using two identification sources. One is the variation across time due to
time-varying factors and changes of choice set over time. The other is the existence of
single-member households (where we can observe individual-level behavior directly). To
illustrate how we achieve identification, a series of in-depth simulations and empirical val-
idations are provided.
To further calibrate our proposed model and algorithm, we applied our model to an empir-
ical setting of household TV viewing and targeted TV advertising on a data set obtained
from Nielsen People Meter (NPM) data where we knew the truth, but pretended that we
didn’t. This empirical application provides us several valuable insights into intragroup
dynamics. Overall, we find that preference revision and behavioral interaction among
household members tend to be positive. That is, household members positively affect each
other’s preferences on TV genres (thus revise their preferences toward each other) and en-
joy watching TV together. Next, we found a negative shift from single-member household
to two-member households overall. Household members in two-member households may
enjoy more from outside options such as shopping together and thus have a negative shift
of watching TV at home.
Finally, we use our estimates to conduct a series of calibrated counterfactual simulations
demonstrating that our proposed model will enable advertisers to better target intragroup
individuals and significantly improve the efficiency of ad targeting. In addition, our pro-
posed model will make it possible for marketers to design better marketing strategies for a
variety of marketing contexts, such as customizing promotions catering to the “powerful”
member’s preference, conducting effective product recommendation based on inference
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of behavioral interaction, and enhancing the customer experience by better understanding
customer joint-consumption processes.
This chapter could be extended in several aspects in the future. First, we focus on intragroup
dynamics in this chapter and assume that the decision mechanism is known. In the future,
we may want to identify the decision mechanism. However, this may require much more
rich data and variation in the data for the identification purpose. Second, we assume that all
households have the same decision mechanism. In the future, we may extend this to allow
heterogeneity in decision mechanism across households. Third, for identification purpose,
we assume that preference revision and decision power in a two-member household are
homogeneous across genres. In the future, we may release these two assumptions and
allow genre-specific preference revision and decision power.
In summary, learning about intragroup dynamics and individual preferences within a group
is important, but has been understudied. In this chapter, we propose a joint consumption
model which can be used to jointly infer heterogeneous individual preferences, intragroup
dynamics, and state dependence when only aggregate and de-identified data are available.
We hope this model is useful for marketers to examine heterogeneous intragroup individ-
ual preferences through observed group consumption choices in a variety of marketing
contexts, which may further enable them to design customized marketing strategies such
as targeting specific types of individuals.
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Chapter 3
Inferring Individual Preferences and
Variety Seeking with Non-ordered Data:
An Application to Video Games
3.1 Introduction
As consumers spend time engaging in experiential products, they may become satiated on
certain product attributes and exhibit preferences for new experiences (variety-seeking), or
they may become “hooked” on certain familiar features and prefer consistency (inertia). It
is useful for firms to identify when consumers are variety-seeking or inertial when predict-
ing purchase patterns and offering recommendations for future consumption occasions. For
example, to a variety-seeking video-game player, it could be more effective to recommend
him a different gaming environment from his previous consumption instead of a similar
one. In the present research, we focus on how game players choose between the various
options across multiple consumption occasions within the same product category. For ex-
ample, in a video game setting where players play an online video game round by round
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(each round they choose a map to play, and there are multiple maps available), each round
is a consumption occasion, and maps are the available options for each round.
Considering the importance of understanding variety-seeking behavior, extensive research
has been done to examine the reasons of variety-seeking (e.g., Kahn 1995, etc.), and to de-
velop models for variety-seeking behavior (e.g., Seetharaman and Chintagunta 1998, etc.).
In this chapter, we intend to identify and fill some gaps between research on variety-seeking
and marketing practice. First, to model and quantify variety-seeking behavior across avail-
able options, we would first need to know the order of the options consumed by each
customer. However, in some cases, we only observe non-ordered data where consumption
order information is missing. This can be commonly seen in some industries. For example,
in a grocery shopping setting, customers may do grocery shopping once a week or even
once a month. So retailers usually observe customers’ consumptions in a certain period
(i.e. a week or a month) but they do not observe customers’ consumption order within the
period. Another example is in the DVD rental industry. Customers usually rent multiple
DVDs at the same time. But their consumption order (i.e., watching order in DVD rental
example) is often not recorded or untrackable.
In this chapter, we propose an identification strategy to handle non-order data, and conduct
empirical analysis in a video game setting where players play a video game round-by-
round. Particularly, we observe the rounds played by each player each day, as well as the
map used in each round, but we do not have information about the order of the rounds/maps
played within a day. To understand individual’s variety-seeking behavior, the consumption
order within a day is critial. To overcome the challenges emerging from non-ordered data,
we propose an augmentation algorithm building on Musalem, Bradlow, and Raju (2008,
2009) in the model estimation process to obtain an augmented data set with full inferred
consumption order within each day. Then, how a customer switches from a map to an-
other provides us information to infer the propensities of variety-seeking and inertia for
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individual customers.
Second, we hypothsize that consumption outcomes may affect consumers’ variety-seeking
behavior. Researchers in psychology and consumer behavior have been paying extensive
attention to the effect of emotions and moods on variety-seeking and inertia (e.g., Kahn
and Isen 1993; Poor, Duhachek, and Krishnan 2012). Although emotions and moods can
be potentially associated with consumption outcomes (e.g., a good consumption outcome
could potentially be associated with a positive mood), little systematic investigation has
been paid directly on how consumption outcomes affect a consumer’s variety-seeking be-
havior. From a marketing practice perspective, learning about how consumption outcomes
affect consumers’ variety-seeking would enable the firm to improve its marketing strategies
corresponding to the observed consumption outcomes.
We predict that positive consumption outcomes lead to inertial preferences, while nega-
tive consumption outcomes lead to variety-seeking. For example, imagine that a Netflix
user just started watching the Netflix Original Series, Jessica Jones. After binge-watching
6 episodes, she gives the show 5 out of 5 stars, which indicates a positive consumption
outcome and will likely lead to her continuing to watching the show or choosing to watch
similar shows, for example, Daredevil which shares several attributes with Jessica Jones,
including being a gritty action series based on Marvel superhero characters. By the same
logic, if the user hated Jessica Jones and gave it 1 star, then it’s likely that she would prefer
to watching something completely different the next time she logs onto Netflix.
Third, prior research has shown that variety-seeking behavior could be related to product
attributes. For example, satiation on product attributes over time is one of the proposed
reasons for variety-seeking behavior (Kahn 1995). Moreover, consumers could have differ-
ent extent of variety-seeking on different attributes. For example, Inman (2001) found that
consumers have more intensive variety-seeking on sensory attributes such as flavor than on
nonsensory attributes such as brand. In this chapter, we develop a model to quantify the
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extent of variety-seeking at the attribute-level. From a perspective of marketing practice,
the attribute-level variety-seeking could potentially shed light on product design (e.g., what
attributes to be incorporated into the design of a product) or recommendations.
In sum, we develop a model to quantify the variety-seeking behavior at individual and
attribute level, taking into account the possible effect on consumption outcomes. Moreover,
we estimate the model with non-ordered data where consumption order within a period is
not observed. We use simulation studies to illustrate the identification ideas and show
that our estimation process can well recover the simulated parameters. We then apply the
proposed model to a data set in an online video-game environment. Across 30 to 40-minute
rounds of play, individual players choose which map they want to play on and experience
consumption outcomes that can be measured by their performance or points earned during
the round. We find that overall better performance results in players choosing similar maps
in subsequent rounds, while poorer performance results in players choosing maps with
different attributes. Furthermore, there is wide heterogeneity across players in terms of
the effect on consumption outcomes on variety-seeking behavior. The heterogeneity across
players suggests the importance to make customized marketing strategies for an individual
player instead of the same strategy for all players.
This chapter contributes to both the academic literature and managerial practice. Regard-
ing academic literature, to our best knowledge, we are among the first to explore Bayesian
data augmentation as a solution for non-ordered data. Traditional augmentation practices
in marketing mostly focus on the missing information about whether an individual con-
sumes the product or not in a period. Instead, we emphasize the order of the consumption
occasions within a period. This consumption order information is important to examine the
dynamics of consumer behavior over time. Second, we look into variety-seeking behavior
and propose an important factor, consumption outcomes, which may drive the variety-
seeking and inertial behavior. This is a new factor examined, in addition to some factors
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proposed in existing literature.
In addition to the contribution to the literature, our research also provides interesting in-
sights to managerial practice. First, this chapter may help firms better design or provide
recommendations to their customers. In many industries, such as video gaming, restau-
rants, travel, vacation, and so on, recommendations have been proven to be effective. Our
method provides a framework to examine individual’s variety-seeking behavior even when
the order of consumption is missing, which enables the firms to design customized rec-
ommendations to an individual customer, based on consumers’ past consumption options
and outcomes. Second, we model the variety-seeking behavior at the attribute level, which
hasn’t been studied and may provide new insights on option design. For example, if cus-
tomers are variety-seeking on one attribute but inertial on another, the firm may design
options accordingly by offering more variations on the former attribute. In sum, in the
video game context examined, our findings would inform the company on how to match
players based on performance level and map preferences, as well as on future map de-
signs and releases. Although we focus specifically on the context of online video games,
our findings can be applied to a broader set of experiential products, including watching
movies and dining at restaurants, and so on.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2, we briefly introduce some
relevant literature, followed by a model and identification discussion in Section 3.3 and
data description in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, we apply our model to a context of an
online video game, in which players choose between different map environments for each
round of play and consumption outcomes can be measured “objectively” by a player’s
performance during the round. In this section, we also show the ability of the estimation
process to recover parameter values via a simulation study. Finally, in Section 3.6, we
provide a summary of conclusions, managerial findings, and implications.
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3.2 Related Literature
In this chapter, we focus on decisions that consumers make when choosing between dif-
ferent options across consumption occasions within the same product category. Variety-
seeking is defined to be when consumers frequently switch between options, while inertia
(or reinforcement) is defined to be when consumers repeatedly choose the same option
across multiple consumption occasions. We review the main reasons that researchers have
identified for why consumers exhibit variety-seeking or inertial behavior, the most recent
models that have been developed to capture variety-seeking, and the behavioral literature
that supports our hypothesis that positive (negative) consumption outcomes lead to inertial
(variety seeking) behaviors.
3.2.1 Why Consumers are Variety-Seeking or Inertial
The concepts of inertia or reinforcement behaviors and variety-seeking were developed
separately before researchers began to think of them as two ends of the same continuum,
so much of the research that provides explanations for these behaviors focuses on one
extreme. Early models used time-lagged variables to capture inertial choices and attributed
them to “brand loyalty” (Jacoby and Kyner 1973; Guadagni and Little 1983). Researchers
explored alternative explanations for inertial behaviors such as state dependence and habit
persistence, which can be disentangled using more sophisticated utility models (Erdem and
Keane 1996; Seetharaman 2004).
On the other hand, Kahn (1995) summarizes the three main reasons for why consumers
may be variety-seeking: (1) external situations, (2) satiation, and (3) future preference un-
certainty. External situations include marketing decisions made by firms. For example,
different firms may promote in alternating weeks (Kahn and Raju 1991) or engage in price
discrimination (Shaffer and Zhang 2000), driving consumers to switch between brands.
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Satiation is a well-studied phenomenon in both behavioral and quantitative research. Sa-
tiation may occur on brands or attributes and lead consumers to seek out products with
new features (McAlister 1982; Inman 2001). Finally, forward-looking consumers may use
variety-seeking as a way to resolve future preference uncertainty and learn about unknown
choices (Walsh 1995; Erdem 1996).
3.2.2 Dynamic Discrete Choice Models
In the classic models of variety-seeking, the underlying assumption is that the consumer
is making choices between options following a first-order Markov process (Jeuland 1979;
Givon 1984; Kahn, Kalwani, and Morrison 1986). The key feature is that there is an explicit
variety-seeking parameter that can be estimated for an individual consumer. Brand choices
are formulated as a standard logit model, but the first-order Markov property allows the
probability of choice to depend on the brand that was chosen previously. The individual
specific variety-seeking parameter determines whether repeat choices or brand switching is
more likely between subsequent consumption occasions.
There have been various extensions to this classic model to take into account variation
across brands, consumers, and time. The brand choice probabilities can be revised to
include brand-specific marketing variables (Seetharaman and Chintagunta 1998). The
variety-seeking parameter can also vary within shoppers by assuming they come from a
flexible distribution. For example, the Beta distribution allows for a bimodal pattern that
can account for shoppers switching between inertial and variety-seeking states (Trivedi et
al. 1994). Heterogeneity across individuals can be modeled as individuals receiving infor-
mation that arrives according to a Poisson timing function (Roy et al. 1996). In our current
model, we will demonstrate the advantages of attribute-based variety-seeking using a dis-
tance between options on each attribute. We also allow variety-seeking to change over time
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based on previously experienced consumption outcomes, and to vary across individuals and
attributes.
3.2.3 Effects of Consumption Outcomes on Variety-Seeking
Consumption outcomes or their proxies are observable for a variety of experiential prod-
ucts. These include star ratings for movies or TV shows on Netflix, star ratings for restau-
rants on Yelp, thumbs up or down for videos on YouTube, and a player’s score on a video
game. We are going to focus on the context of video games, which has been mostly unex-
plored within the marketing literature. Player scores allow for a clean, relatively objective,
and continuous measure of each player’s consumption outcomes.
We hypothesize that positive consumption outcomes will lead to inertia, while negative
consumption outcomes will lead to variety-seeking. Our model is also able to account
for the magnitude of consumption outcomes in either direction, so the degree of variety-
seeking or inertia also depends on how positive or negative the experienced outcomes are,
relative to some reference point. Although we model the effects of consumption outcomes
across a continuum, when we examine the behavioral work in support of our hypothesis,
we focus on the valence of the outcomes (positive or negative) and how they might map to
emotional responses. For example, for the Netflix TV show Jessica Jones, 5 stars would
indicate a positive consumption outcome. For a military-based shooting game, positive net
kills would be a positive consumption outcome. Likewise, a 1-star rating for Jessica Jones
would indicate a negative consumption outcome, while a net of 15 deaths would indicate a
negative consumption outcome for the shooter game.
Researchers in psychology and consumer behavior have long been interested in the effects
of emotions on people’s choice behaviors, but there is some disagreement on how posi-
tive and negative aspects influences variety-seeking. A positive valence has been shown
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to increase variety-seeking behavior among enjoyable products, as long as they don’t have
any negative features (Kahn and Isen 1993). Positive moods seem to drive people to seek
out more stimulation, but this pattern might break down at very extreme positive moods
(Roehm and Roehm 2005). Other research shows that differentiation of positive and nega-
tive emotions of the experience slows the satiation process due to cognitive appraisal, and
so focusing on negative emotions may result in more enjoyment of repeated experiences
(Poor, Duhachek, and Krishnan 2012).
In contrast to this prior research, we focus on the aspect generated by the same source as
the choices being made, rather than an external manipulation of mood. We hypothesize
that positive consumption outcomes should lead people to have more inertial preferences.
This is consistent with literature that suggests that encountering high-value rewards will
intensify motivational states towards the same reward source (Berridge 2012) and positive
rewards may “whet” the reward appetite (Wadhwa, Shiv, and Nowlis 2008). In our context,
a video game player may experience a hot streak and expect continued positive outcomes
from playing within the same or similar map environments. On the other hand, negative
consumption outcomes lead to variety-seeking, which is consistent with the notion that
helplessness and sadness result in people wanting to change their current state (Keltner,
Ellsworth, and Ed wards 1993; Lazarus 1991), and they may choose to do this through
consumption choices (Lerner et al. 2004). A player may feel sad or frustrated after a tough
loss, but a change of scene in the next round may boost their engagement in the game.
3.3 Model
The degree of variety-seeking may vary across product categories (Kahn et al. 1986) or
individuals (Givon 1984), but the model we develop is more appropriate for capturing how
the degree of variety-seeking varies within individual consumers. Our model captures in-
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dividual choices across multiple consumption occasions. All variables are specified at the
individual level, for individual n. In the base model, the probability of a consumer choosing
option j depends on the individual n’s intrinsic preferences for option j, znj . Without any
time varying effects, the probability of each choice j is formulated by a standard logit:
pn ( j) =
exp
(
znj
)
∑ j′ exp
(
znj′
) (3.1)
Here, to examine the variety-seeking/inertial behavior, we focus on the switching behavior
of choices among several options instead of whether the individual consumes an option.
The above equation (32) can be considered as, given individual n consumes an option,
what is the probability that she consumes option j. To capture how consumers respond to
consumption outcomes over time, we specify choice preferences to be first-order Markov
across rounds. So the probability of selecting map j depends on the option i that was
selected in the previous round. This choice depends on the individual’s intrinsic preferences
for option j, znj , and the distance di jk between option j and the previous option i on each
attribute k (which represents the extent of difference on attribute k between the two options;
the more the difference, the higher the distance):
pnt ( j) =
exp
(
znj +∑k
(
αnk +β
n
k ·X
n
t−1
)
di jk
)
∑ j′ exp
(
znj′+∑k
(
αnk +β
n
k ·X
n
t−1
)
di j′k
) (3.2)
where αnk +β
n
k ·X
n
t describes the individual n’s variety-seeking factor on attribute k, with
αnk as an intercept and β
n
k describes how the variety-seeking on attribute k depends on
previous consumption outcome variable Xnt−1. If α
n
k +β
n
k ·X
n
t−1 ≥ 0, then the player n is
variety-seeking on attribute k at occasion t; on the other hand, if αnk +β
n
k ·X
n
t−1 ≤ 0, then
the individual is inertial on attribute k. β nk describes how outcome variable affects the
variety-seeking factors. A positive β nk means higher outcome leads to stronger variety-
67
seeking on attribute k. The probability also depends on the distance between the options on
each attribute. So a variety-seeking player is also more likely to switch to options that are
farther away, while an inertial player is more likely to choose options that are closer to the
previously chosen option.
In the model above in equation (3.2), all parameters are specified at individual level (for
individual n), including preferences on choice znj (for j = 1, ...,J where J is the total num-
ber of choices), and αnk , β
n
k (for k = 1, ..,K where K is the total number of attributes). We
further assume that these parameters follow independent normal distribution across indi-
viduals.
znj ∼ N
(
z̄ j,σz j
)
f or j ∈ {1, ...,J} (3.3)
α
n
k ∼ N (ᾱk,σαk) f or k ∈ {1, ...,K} (3.4)
β
n
k ∼ N
(
β̄k,σβk
)
f or k ∈ {1, ...,K} (3.5)
3.3.1 Identification with Non-ordered Data
First, we discuss the identification of the proposed model when we have complete data
information including the map consumption order. In this case, equation (3.2) above can
be written as
pt ( j) =
1
∑ j′ exp
(
z j′− z j +∑k (αk +βk ·Xt−1)
(
di j′k−di jk
)) (3.6)
where the probability for option j depends on the difference in intrinsic preferences z j′− z j
and distance on each attribute,
(
di j′k−di jk
)
. To identify the model, we assume that z1 = 0
since we can only identify the difference among preferences instead of preferences itself.
Then we consider a case when part of the consumption order information is missing.
Specifically, assuming there are W periods, in a period w, the consumer consumes the prod-
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uct in multiple occasions. Although we have information about what options the consumer
choose on each occasion, we do not have information about the order of the occasions in
this period. For example, we observed that a video game player plays map1 twice and
map2 three times in a day, but we do not have information the order of the five occasions
in this day. In this case, first of all, even with aggregate and non-ordered data, we have
information about the total number of times a consumer chooses each option j, which pro-
vides us information about preference z j (compared with z1). Second, the variation across
periods help us identify the variety-seeking factor.
In Appendix E, we provide a more detailed numerical example to show the identification
source of the proposed model. Here we illustrate the identification idea of variety-seeking
using a small example vignette. Consider a player who equally likes two maps: map1
and map2. In each period, the player plays five times. We then compare the difference in
the following two cases observed from aggregate and non-ordered data (where we observe
only the aggregate consumption information in each period instead of the order of the five
consumption occasions). First, in case that the player is high in variety-seeking, we expect
to observe the following pattern: map1 twice and map2 three times in a period, followed
by map2 twice and map1 three times in another period, and then repeat. This is because if
the player has strong variety-seeking, he will switch to different maps every time. Second,
in case that the player has strong inertia, we expect the player to consume the same map
for a long time and occasionally switch to the other map only. So we expect the following
pattern from aggregate and non-ordered data: we may see, for example, in first few periods,
the player always plays map1 (so we observe five map1 in each of the first few periods),
and he switches to map2 occasionally, but once switches, he sticks to map2 for a while.
Thus, different patterns will be observed with different levels of variety-seeking.
In short, we will be able to recover preference on a choice j based on how frequently it has
been selected; and, based on the variation across periods observed with non-ordered data.
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In Section 3.5.2, we use a simulation study to further show that we are able to fully recover
the parameters simulated with aggregate non-ordered data.
3.4 Data Description
Our data set was awarded through the Wharton Customer Analytics Initiative (WCAI) from
a large video game developer. We have data on the activity of 1,309 frequent players
of an online multiplayer first-person shooter video game. Players engage in campaigns
averaging 20 minutes in length in two competing teams. We focus on the rounds played on
the firm’s public servers and exclude the rounds played on player’s private servers. There
are on average 20 players involved in each round, and people rarely play with the same
player twice. In this chapter, we focus on each player’s rounds played across two months,
starting from the game’s release. Each round is considered to be a particular consumption
occasion t. During each round, players are allowed to choose what map they want to play
on. The map is basically a game environment with a set of attributes and features. We are
interested in the player’s map choice. Players are presented with a set of M = 9 maps. The
player then chooses a map and is dropped into a server by the firm’s matching algorithm
with other players to play a round. After the round, the player is shown his/her individual
round outcomes, which include the total score, the number of kills, the number of deaths,
individual points earned for completing certain tasks in the round, etc. In the next round,
the player will again have the opportunity to select a map.
Whether a player switches frequently among maps is an indicator to assess the variety-
seeking of the player. However, simply looking at the switching rate could be misleading
sometimes. For example, if a player switches frequently between two favorite maps which
are very similar to each other, then we may see high switching rate but in fact, this player
is inertia to these two maps. To address this issue, we enable attribute-specific variety-
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seeking in the proposed model and incorporate the distance between any two maps in each
attribute. Specifically, there are two attributes for each map: Combat Type and Terrain. For
example, there are four possible combat types, including CombinedArms (CA), Vehicle,
Infantry, and UrbanWarfare (UW). Similarly, each map may have one or more of the eight
possible terrains: Countryside (CS), Woodland (WL), Mountainous, Urban, Rocky, Docks,
Desert, and Underground (U.G.). Table 3.1 summarizes the attributes of the 9 maps. For
example, Map 1 has a combat type of Infantry and a terrain of Urban.
Table 3.1: Attributes of Maps
Map
Attribute 1: Combat Type
Combined Arms Vehicle Infantry UrbanWarfare
MAP 1 0 0 1 0
MAP 2 0 0 1 0
MAP 3 1 1 0 0
MAP 4 0 0 1 0
MAP 5 1 1 0 0
MAP 6 0 1 0 0
MAP 7 1 0 0 0
MAP 8 1 1 0 0
MAP 9 0 0 1 1
Map
Attribute 2: Terrain
Country Woodland Mount. Urban Rocky Docks Desert U. ground
MAP 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
MAP 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
MAP 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
MAP 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
MAP 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
MAP 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
MAP 7 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
MAP 8 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
MAP 9 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
We then describe the distance between two maps on each of the two attributes. Specifically,
for example, for Combat Type attribute, we calculate the sum of the difference between two
maps in four possible combat types. For example, map2 has combat type of Infantry, while
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map3 has combat type of CombinedArms (CA) and Vehicle. So out of the four possible
types, map2 and map3 are different in three of them (the only common is that they both
do not have UrbanWarfare), so their distance on Combat Type attribute is 3. Following the
same way to calculate the distance between two maps on Terrain attribute, we summarize
the distance on the two attributes in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 respectively.
Table 3.2: Distance on Attribute: Combat Type
Map 1 Map 2 Map 3 Map 4 Map 5 Map 6 Map 7 Map 8 Map 9
Map 1 0 0 3 0 3 2 2 3 1
Map 2 0 0 3 0 3 2 2 3 1
Map 3 3 3 0 3 0 1 1 0 4
Map 4 0 0 3 0 3 2 2 3 1
Map 5 3 3 0 3 0 1 1 0 4
Map 6 2 2 1 2 1 0 2 1 3
Map 7 2 2 1 2 1 2 0 1 3
Map 8 3 3 0 3 0 1 1 0 4
Map 9 1 1 4 1 4 3 3 4 0
Table 3.3: Distance on Attribute: Terrain
Map 1 Map 2 Map 3 Map 4 Map 5 Map 6 Map 7 Map 8 Map 9
Map 1 0 0 3 0 2 2 2 1 1
Map 2 0 0 3 0 2 2 2 1 1
Map 3 3 3 0 3 3 3 5 4 4
Map 4 0 0 3 0 2 2 2 1 1
Map 5 2 2 3 2 0 2 4 3 3
Map 6 2 2 3 2 2 0 4 3 3
Map 7 2 2 5 2 4 4 0 1 3
Map 8 1 1 4 1 3 3 1 0 2
Map 9 1 1 4 1 3 3 3 2 0
In addition to the distance between two maps, an important variable in the proposed model
is the consumption outcome. After each round, the player experiences a set of individual
consumption outcomes. These include Total Points, Combat Points, Kills, Deaths, and
Net Kills. These variables are all pretty highly correlated (see Table 3.4), so we use one
of them, Total Points, to measure the overall performance. Total Points is generally the
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primary objective of the game. Besides, total points represent the overall performance of
the player in a round, and can be considered as a measurement which takes into account all
the other outcomes.
Table 3.4: Correlation of Outcomes
Total Points Combat Points Kills Deaths Net Kills
Total Points 1
Combat Points 0.79 1
Kills 0.73 0.84 1
Deaths 0.47 0.59 0.66 1
Net Kills 0.44 0.44 0.57 -0.24 1
3.5 Model Estimation
In this section, we first describe the estimation process we use for the proposed model. Then
we demonstrate the identification of the model parameters in a simulation study by showing
that we are able to recover the simulated parameters with non-ordered data. Finally, we
present the estimation results using the video game data set and discuss relevant findings.
3.5.1 Estimation Process
In this chapter, due to the missing information about the consumption order in a period, we
incorporate a data augmentation process in the estimation process. Assuming we have W
periods, in period w, the consumer consumes the products in lw occasions (each occasion
consumes an option). Since the consumption order information is missing, we do not know
the order of the lw occasions in period w. We do the estimation in a two-step iterative
process as follows.
In the first step, we augment the missing information about the order of consumption oc-
casions in each period w. With lw occasions, there are lw! possible consumption orders in
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period w. So the number of possible consumption orders could increase sharply with an
increase of lw. For example, lw = 5 and lw = 10 correspond to 120 and 3,628,800 possible
consumption orders respectively. To overcome the curse of dimensionality, we propose a
switching algorithm in the augmentation process. Note that we observe the option con-
sumed and the outcome for each consumption c, but we do not observe the order of the
consumption occasions. In sum, there are lw consumption observed in period w; the task is
to “match” each of these lw consumption (based on the option consumed and outcome) to
an occasion t.
Similar to Musalem, Bradlow, and Raju (2008, 2009), we use a switching algorithm in
the augmentation step. The idea of the proposed switching algorithm is to have an initial
consumption order within each day first, and then gradually improve the consumption order
by switching consumption occasions within the same day. The main difference between the
proposed algorithm and the algorithm by Musalem, Bradlow, and Raju (2008, 2009) is that,
instead of randomly generating pairs in each iteration, we follow certain orders to generate
pairs to compare and decide whether to switch. Specifically, in period w, we follow the
following process to augment consumed option of occasion t for t ∈ {1, ..., lw}.
Algorithm 3.1 A Switching Algorithm in Augmentation Step
(a1) If there is only one occasion in period w (lw = 1), we only have one consumption c
and one occasion t; so we will be able to match them without augmentation;
(a2) If there is more than one occasion, from occasion 1 to lw, we do the following:
(i) If t = 1, the available consumption set includes all lw consumption in period w;
otherwise, update available consumption set by removing the consumption matched to t−1
(from the latest consumption set);
(ii) Switch current consumption in occasion t with each consumption in the available
consumption set respectively (including a case in which we do not switch but keep current
consumption order); calculate the corresponding probability of each switch according to
equation (2);
(iii) Randomly choose one of the switches based on the calculated probabilities, and
match it to occasion t accordingly;
(a3) Repeat the above process until finished for all periods and all occasions.
In the second step of our estimation process, with augmented consumption order infor-
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mation, we estimate the proposed model assuming all consumption order information is
known. We implement an MCMC Gibbs-sampling framework to draw parameters one by
one, including the preference on each option j, znj , as well as the variety-seeking parameters
for each attribute αnk and β
n
k . For identification purposes, preference for the first option, z
n
1,
is fixed to be 0. After drawing these parameters for individuals, we draw partial pooling
means and variances using conjugate priors.
3.5.2 A Simulation Study
To test the proposed estimation process and check whether we are able to recover model
parameters, we simulate a data set where there are 50 players playing 9 maps in a video
game. These 9 maps have the same features/attributes as the 9 maps we have in the video
game data set. For each player, we simulate playing behavior in 60 days, each day has 5
occasions. Playing outcomes for each occasion, as well as parameters for individuals are
randomly drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 0.5.
We assume that we do not observe the consumption order within a day. In sum, there are
12 parameters to estimate for each player n, including preferences for 8 maps znj , and two
parameters αnk and β
n
k for each of the two attributes. Note that preference for the first map
is fixed to be 0 for identification.
For model estimation, we run two chains of MCMC, each for 10,000 iterations and the first
5,000 iterations are discarded on the basis of trace plots and Gelman-Rubin diagnostics
(Gelman-Rubin 1992). The MCMC chains are thinned to remove autocorrelation between
draws and every 20th draw is used for the subsequent analysis. Figure 3.1 compares the
estimation results (mean of posterior MCMC iterations) with simulated values for each of
the 12 parameters. Each graph is for one parameter, and each point on a graph stand for one
of the 50 players. The dashed line stands for a line where estimation perfectly matches the
simulated value. As shown in Figure 3.1, for each player and each parameter, the estimated
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value is close to the corresponding simulated value, which indicates the ability to recover
simulated parameter and the identification of the proposed model.
Figure 3.1: Estimation Results vs. Simulated Values
We further run a benchmark model where variety-seeking behavior is ignored. Specifically,
we assume all variety-seeking behavior parameters, α and β , to be 0, and then estimate the
proposed model. As shown in Figure 3.2 which compares the estimation on individual
preferences with simulated parameter values, estimation results ignoring variety-seeking
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are biased. For example, ignoring the variety-seeking behavior, for 19 out of 50 simulated
players, estimated preferences on map 2 are significantly lower than corresponding simu-
lated preferences at a significance level of 0.01 (according to their MCMC estimation mean
and standard deviation). Thus, ignoring the variety-seeking behavior may cause biases on
the estimation of individual preferences.
Figure 3.2: Estimation Results Ignoring Variety-Seeking vs. Simulated Values
3.5.3 Estimation Results and Discussion
We apply our model to the data set of an online multiplayer first-person shooter video game
described in Section 3.4. In this video game, players play the game round-by-round, choos-
ing a map to play each round. When the game was released, there were nine maps available
for all players. Five additional map packages were released afterward; each contained three
to five new maps. However, these additional packages were available only for players with
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premium membership or for players who pay an additional charge for the packages. In
this chapter, we focus on the map choice on the original nine maps before the release of
additional packages, which is a two-month time window between the release of the game
and the release of the first additional package. There are 514 frequent players who have
ever played the game in this two-month window.
3.5.3.1 Estimation Results
As described in Section 3.4, each map has two attributes: combat type and terrain. We
look into the preference of each player on the 9 maps respectively, as well as their variety-
seeking factor on each of these two attributes. We use the logarithm of total points of each
round as the playing outcome. The average total points is about 3,000 across all rounds and
all players. We normalize the total points each round with 3,000. So the outcome variable,
logarithm of the normalized total point, indicates how much the outcome is better/worse
than the overall average of 3,000. There are 12 parameters to estimate for each player
n, including preferences for 8 maps znj , and two parameters α
n
k and β
n
k for each of the
two attributes. Note that preference for the first map is fixed to be 0 for identification.
For model estimation, we run two chains of MCMC, each for 10,000 iterations and the first
5,000 iterations are discarded on the basis of trace plots and Gelman-Rubin diagnostics. We
further thin the MCMC chains to remove autocorrelation between draws and keep every
20th draw. Table 3.5 illustrates the estimation results for one randomly selected player.
The first row shows the estimation means of the MCMC iterations whereas the second row
shows corresponding standard deviation in the MCMC iterations.
Table 3.5: An Example Estimation Result for a Player
z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 z7 z8 z9 α1 β1 α2 β2
Mean -0.49 0.95 -0.17 0.29 0.56 0.52 0.13 -0.48 -0.17 -1.00 -0.40 -0.53
Std. 0.19 0.24 0.18 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.12
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In Table 3.5, z2 to z9 describe the preference on map 2 to map 9 respectively, with a refer-
ence of 0 on map 1. For example, the player prefers map 3 most since he has the highest
preference of 0.95 on map 3. α1 and β1 describe the variety-seeking of this player on at-
tribute “Combat Type” whereas α2 and β2 are for another attribute “Terrain”. Note that,
V S1 ≡ α1 + β1 · x stands for the overall variety seeking factor for this player on attribute
“Combat Type” when playing outcome is x; a negative value on V S1 means the player is
inertial on this attribute while a positive value means the player is variety-seeking. Simi-
larly, V S2 ≡ α2 +β2 · x can be used to describe the overall variety-seeking for this player
on the attribute “Terrain”.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the amount of variety-seeking on these two attributes and how they
change with the playing outcome (which is the total points received for a playing round).
The dashed line shows the variety-seeking for the Combat Type attribute while the solid
line is for the Terrain attribute. As shown, both variety-seeking factors decrease when the
playing outcome gets better, which means the player becomes more inertial. Second, the
player switches from variety-seeking to inertia (from a positive variety-seeking to negative)
at some point. For example, when the playing outcome is higher than 1600, the player is
inertia on Terrain, otherwise, he is variety-seeking on this attribute.
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Figure 3.3: Variety-Seeking on Attributes versus Playing Outcomes
Table 3.5 provides estimation results of an example player who is randomly selected; to
examine the overall variety-seeking factor on each attribute across all players, we look
into the partial-pooling mean for α and β respectively. Table 3.6 provides the estimation
results (mean and standard deviation of kept MCMC iterations) for four partial pooling
mean parameters, including α and β for each of the two attributes. As shown, β̄1 and β̄2
are negative, which indicates that overall a better playing outcome will reduce the variety-
seeking behavior and strengthen inertial behavior. Furthermore, both ᾱ1 and ᾱ2 are also
negative. These two parameters indicate variety-seeking on the two attributes respectively
when the normalized playing outcome is zero, i.e. if the playing outcome is equal to the
overall mean of 3000. A negative α means that the player would be inertia (with negative
variety-seeking) when he has a playing outcome equal to the overall mean. So overall,
the players have the similar variety-seeking pattern on each attribute as the example player
shown in Figure 3.3: they are variety-seeking when the playing outcome is low, but become
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more and more inertia when the playing outcome improves.
Table 3.6: Estimation of Partial Pooling Mean on Variety-Seeking Parameters
ᾱ1 β̄1 ᾱ2 β̄2
Est. Mean -0.55 -0.50 -0.17 -0.21
Est. Std. 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05
3.5.3.2 Heterogeneity
Now we look into the heterogeneity structure of the variety-seeking parameters in Figure
3.4. Specifically, each graph in Figure 3.4 is for one of the four parameters. Each graph
presents the histogram of the corresponding parameter over 514 players, where negative
values are presented in orange while positive values are in blue. As shown in Figure 3.4,
there is heterogeneity in each of the four parameters: most players have negative values
while some are positive. For example, about 24% of players are estimated to have a positive
β1 (for attribute Combat Type). For these players, we expect them to be more variety-
seeking on Combat Type when the playing outcome becomes higher.
81
Figure 3.4: Distribution of Variety-Seeking Parameters across Players
In sum, we find that players become more inertia/less variety-seeking on both attributes
when playing outcome becomes better. Furthermore, there is heterogeneity across players.
To further look into how players’ variety-seeking on two attributes change with playing
outcome, we summarize the joint distribution of β1 and β2 in Table 3.7. Using a signifi-
cance level of 0.05, we examine the estimation result of each player to check whether their
estimated β1 and β2 are significantly different from 0 or not. For example, Table 3.7 shows
that, only 2 players have significantly positive β1 and β2, so only two players become more
variety-seeking on both attributes when the playing outcome improves.
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Table 3.7: Distribution of β1 and β2
β2 > 0 significantly β2 not significant β2 < 0 significantly
β1 > 0 significantly 2 17 23
β1 not significant 19 95 80
β1 < 0 significantly 46 160 72
One of the reasons why some players may be more variety-seeking when better playing
outcomes occur may lie in the discrepancy between good playing outcome and good expe-
rience from the game. Such kind of discrepancies can come from multiple sources. First,
we use total points gained from the round as the measure of the playing outcome; these
outcome variables may not be appropriate for some players. For example, some players
may focus on killing (the number of enemies they kill in the game) instead of total points
(which is a comprehensive measure, not only killing, but also other factors are taken into
account, such as the objectives destroyed, death, the weapon used and so on). Second, a
good playing outcome is not always the objective. For example, for some players, their ma-
jor objective could be challenging themselves, and the enjoy to overcome difficult combat
or task. In this case, a good playing outcome on a map, indicating that they are skilled on
the map, may make them more likely to switch to a map with different features/attributes
to have more challenges in the future. The heterogeneity across players emphasizes the
importance to make customized strategies to an individual player.
3.6 Conclusion
We built a model that allows for an attribute-specific parameter to describe how the variety-
seeking of an individual on product attributes depends explicitly on consumption outcomes.
We estimate our model with non-ordered data where we do not observe consumption or-
der information within a period. Specifically, our estimation involves a two-step iterative
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MCMC process. In the first step, we augment the consumption order using a switching al-
gorithm; in the second step, we estimate the model with augmented data where we assume
consumption order is known using an MCMC Gibbs-sampling framework.
We verify the model identification and validate the estimation process using a simulation
study, where we successfully recover simulated parameters using non-ordered data. Af-
ter that, we apply our model to an empirical analysis of an online video game context.
The results from our analysis lend support to our hypothesis that, in general, positive con-
sumption outcomes lead to inertia, while negative consumption outcomes lead to variety
seeking. Although our analyses were conducted within the context of player map choices
within an online video game, our model and findings can be extended to other domains of
experiential products, including TV shows and restaurants.
There are several extensions that could be made to our current model. First, to focus on
variety-seeking behavior, we look into choices among available options in this chapter but
do not examine the process of whether to consume. In this future, we may look further into,
for example, how consumption outcomes affect whether the consumer continues to succes-
sively consume the product or not. Second, there might be a learning process. Consumers
may switch to other options to learn more about the available options. In our empirical
example, players may choose different maps to learn about the features of the maps. In this
chapter, we assume that consumers are familiar with available options. This assumption
may be relaxed in the future to incorporate a learning process. Third, variety-seeking could
be dynamic over time due to some other factors, in addition to consumption outcomes. For
example, players may explore/play widely with many maps first, but with playing maps
more and more, they may become gradually focus on one or two favorite maps. In this
case, players’ variety-seeking gradually reduces over time. Or, from another perspective,
the players may become more and more variety seeking over time because they satiate on
some attributes of the maps.
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For managers, this research will provide a method for determining individual customer
preferences and how these preferences change over time based on consumption outcomes,
as well as when customers might be more susceptible to the release of new products and
whether they should be novel or similar to existing products. Within the specific context of
online campaign-based video games, consumption outcomes in each round of game play
may be defined by the performance of the player. The firm may use these performance
metrics to determine whether players are becoming bored or frustrated with the current
playing experience and prefer a change of scene, or are on an exciting winning streak and
want to continue with the same experience. This provides an opportunity to enhance the
firm’s current matching algorithm by suggesting that the player’s consumption outcomes
aspect their preferences over time.
In the general context of experiential products, understanding whether consumers are variety-
seeking or inertial may allow firms to provide better recommendations to consumers by
taking their ratings on past purchase or consumption occasions into account as a measure
of their consumption outcomes. Our findings suggest that, in general, it might be effective
for a firm to target satisfied customers with products that are similar to those they consumed
in prior occasions, but target dissatisfied customers with products that are very different.
Lastly, considering the heterogeneity across consumers observed, our model enables firms
to examine each customer individually, and design efficient customized marketing strate-
gies (e.g., recommendations, promotions, etc.) accordingly.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
In this dissertation, we extend prior research on inferring individual preferences by incor-
porating intragroup dynamics and variety-seeking behavior respectively. This dissertation
provides examples of incorporating important latent behavioral factors (besides intrinsic
preferences), such as possible social influence and interactions or interactions across con-
sumption occasions, into account when inferring individual preferences. Specifically, in
Chapter 2, we develop a new method to infer heterogeneous individual preferences and state
dependence during joint consumption, with consideration of three potentially confounded
components of intragroup dynamics (including preference revision, behavioral interaction
and decision power). In Chapter 3, we propose an innovative method to infer heteroge-
neous individual preferences and consumption order, with consideration of variety-seeking
behavior as well as the effect of the consumption outcomes. In both chapters, we show
that ignoring important latent behavioral factors, such as intragroup dynamics or variety-
seeking behavior, could lead to biased estimation on individual preferences and have sev-
eral consequences. With an application to the TV viewing and targeted TV advertising,
we demonstrate that our model in Chapter 2 (Essay 1) could significantly improve the
efficiency of TV ad targeting in marketing practice. Also, in Chapter 3, in a context of
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video-game playing, we find that positive consumption outcomes lead to inertial prefer-
ences, while negative consumption outcomes lead to variety-seeking.
One of the novel aspects of this dissertation is that we allow incomplete information in the
estimation process. In Chapter 2, we allow missing information on individual’s behavior
and identity (where we observe the total consumption for a group of customers, but we do
not know how many and which of them consume which product); whereas, in Chapter 3,
we tackle the challenge arising from missing information on the order of the consumption
(where we observe the consumption occasions in a period, but we do not observe their
order). With incomplete data, we use two-step iterative MCMC processes to estimate the
models: a forward-backward algorithm in Chapter 2 and a switching algorithm in Chap-
ter 3 to augment and impute missing information. We then estimate the individual-level
Bayesian models with augmented data. In both chapters, we use simulation studies to vali-
date the proposed methods, identification strategies, and estimation algorithms.
Our work in this dissertation sheds light on a variety of marketing contexts. First of all, both
chapters focus on better inferring heterogeneous individual preferences. Gaining insightful
information and understanding individual preferences properly are the premise of personal-
ization, such as ad targeting and so on. With advances in new technology, it becomes easier
to collect relatively rich data compared to the past. The data collected (even for big data),
however, often lack important and useful information. To remove the barrier and overcome
the challenges of underpinning new waves of marketing innovation, there is a need to de-
velop advanced methods and algorithms to infer heterogeneous individual preferences with
incomplete information. For example, the model proposed in Chapter 2 enables marketers
to target a much narrowly defined customer more efficiently when only aggregate and de-
identified data are observed, including household TV viewing and targeted TV advertising
discussed in this chapter and other applications such as retailing, membership enrollment,
and so on. In addition, the method proposed in Chapter 3 can be used to learn about each
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customer’s latest preferences, taking into account his/her previous consumption outcomes
and variety-seeking behavior, to improve the effectiveness of customized recommendation
or promotion campaigns. In sum, this dissertation contributes to marketing practice by
improving ways to infer individual preferences and consumption behavior, which enable
marketers to better understand their customers and make customized marketing strategies
correspondingly.
Our work in this dissertation can be extended in several aspects in the future. First, we
may further take into account some other factors or behavioral patterns which may affect
customers’ consumption behavior. For example, there is an emerging type of behavior
increasingly appearing during joint consumption, namely binging within a group behavior
setting. Although previous research, mostly from a psychological standpoint, has been
devoted to studying consumer’s binge behavior, rather less attention has been paid to learn
about whether and how group interaction affects consumers’ binge behavior, as well as
its implications to firms’ marketing strategy. In the future, we may empirically document
how group interaction during joint consumption of a product affects both consumer’s binge
behavior in the short run and consumption behavior in the long run. Taking into account
binge behavior, we might be able to better infer individual preferences in some marketing
contexts whether people may binge, such as online video watching, online video games,
and so on.
Second, we may look into more ways to incorporate incomplete data. Although firms have
more and more data, there are some areas that are difficult to collect data. For example, the
offline consumption behavior within a household. It is usually difficult to have information
about which member(s) in a household consumes, for example, the yogurt purchased. Even
with online behavior, there are more and more privacy regulations which restrict tracking
consumers’ online behavior. Simply put rich data does not mean rich information. In the
future, we may need more work on better extracting information either from incomplete
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data or from data with poor information (even though the data are complete).
In sum, in this dissertation, we examine how to better infer heterogeneous individual pref-
erences and important latent behavioral behavior, especially when the information is in-
complete. There are some aspects which we may extend our work in this dissertation in
the future. We hope our work in this dissertation provides the building blocks of future
research on inferring individual preferences as well as relevant marketing strategies.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Model Estimation of Chapter 2
Following the discussion in Section 2.3.1, we define the missing data (Y misht ) as the dif-
ference between the complete information when everything was observed ( Y compht ) and
observed information for household h at time t (Y obsht ). That is, Y
comp
ht = Y
mis
ht
⊕
Y obsht where
operator
⊕
means the combination of two information sources. For example, the combi-
nation of a (missing) information that “member A consumes alone”, with an observed in-
formation that “Y obsht = g” will lead to a complete information that
{
Y Aht = g,Y
B
ht = 0
}
. Note
that, we need Y compht to estimate the individual-level model. To do so, we first augment
the missing information (Y misht ) and then estimate the model using augmented information.
Specifically, we iteratively draw samples of parameter set Ψ and missing information Y misht
in the following two steps, which is similar to a Gibbs sampling framework:
Step 1 (data augmentation): Generate a sample of Y misht (for each household h and time t)
based on
{
Y obsh ,Ψi
}
where Ψi is a draw of parameters in current iteration, i.e., sampling
p
(
Y misht |Y
obs
h ,Ψi
)
.
Step 2 (parameter estimation): Generate a sample of Ψi+1 based on
{
Y mis,Y obs
}
using the
augmented individual-level data, i.e., sampling p
(
Ψi+1|Y mis,Y obs
)
.
In the description above, Y obsh (where we omit subscript t) stands for observed information
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of household h in all periods. Similarly, Y obs(Y mis) refers to observed information (aug-
mented missing information) for all households and all periods. Note that in our setting,
we need to sample p
(
Y misht |Y
obs
h ,Ψi
)
, where the distribution of the missing individual-level
information of household h at time t(Y misht ) depends on observed information of household
h in all periods (Y obsh ), instead of observed information of household h at time t only (Y
obs
ht ).
Specifically, a member’s consumption choice at time t depends on his or her consumption
choice in the previous period t−1, while her or his consumption choice at time t−1 further
depends on that at time t−2, and so on. That is, the missing individual-level information
of household h at time t(Y misht ) is correlated across time, which makes it challenging to im-
plement Step 1 described above. Moreover, since we estimate the model iteratively using
a Gibbs sampling framework, in each iteration, it is likely that Ψi highly depends on aug-
mented Y misht while augmented Y
mis
ht in the next iteration will highly and circularly depend on
Ψi in the current iteration. Because of the uncertainty of estimated values, a small deviation
from augmented Y misht to Y
true
ht may affect the estimation significantly. To overcome these
challenges, we propose a forward-backward algorithm to simultaneously incorporate the
dependence of time-correlated missing information and the uncertainty of estimated val-
ues, which significantly facilitates our data augmentation process and improves the speed
of convergence in the estimation. We discuss data augmentation in Step 1 and parameter
estimation in Step 2 above respectively in the following subsections.
A.1 Step 1: Data Augmentation: A Forward-Backward Algorithm
Building on the proposed joint consumption model, we discuss how we estimate and iden-
tify our model using aggregate and de-identified data. We start our discussion with a data
augmentation process (Step 1) to impute missing individual-level data for household h. For
the purpose of notation simplicity, we omit subscript h in this discussion. As we discussed,
the dependence of time-correlated missing individual-level information significantly in-
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creases the difficulty of implementing data augmentation for this model.
To handle the dependence of time-correlated missing information, we propose a general
forward-backward algorithm. First, since Y mist depends on the missing information in all
previous periods, Y mist ′<t , we need to sequentially augment missing information from the be-
ginning to the end (from time t = 1 to t = T ). Therefore, we have a “forward” process
where we augment forwardly based on information in all previous periods. Using this for-
ward process, we utilize all information before time t to sample Y mist , which can be seen as
an approximation of sampling p
(
Y mist |Y obs1:t ,Ψ
)
where Y obs1:t refers to observed information
by time t. Second, observed information after time t (Y obst+1:T ) depends on Y
mis
t and thus
presumably it also should be taken into account to update the posterior of Y mist . We achieve
this goal by a backward process where, after the forward process, we reverse augmentation
of Y mist from the end of periods (t = T ) to the beginning of periods (t = 1).
The idea behind the process described above is that sampling of p
(
Y mist |Y obs,Ψ
)
will be
significantly simplified if complete information at time t−1 and t+1 is available. Because,
p
(
Y mist |Y obs,Ψ
)
∝ p
(
Y mist |Y
comp
t−1 ,Y
obs
t ,Y
comp
t+1 ,Ψ
)
∝ p
(
Y compt−1 |Y
mis
t ,Y
obs
t ,Ψ
)
· p
(
Y compt+1 |Y
mis
t ,Y
obs
t ,Ψ
)
· p
(
Y mist
)
(A.1−1)
∝ p
(
Y mist |Y
comp
t−1 ,Y
obs
t ,Ψ
)
· p
(
Y compt+1 |Y
mis
t ,Y
obs
t ,Ψ
)
where p
(
Y mist |Y
comp
t−1 ,Y
obs
t ,Ψ
)
refers to the forward step that we use (approximated) com-
plete information in the previous period (t− 1) while p
(
Y compt+1 |Y mist ,Y obst ,Ψ
)
refers to the
backward step that we use (approximated) complete information in the next period (t +1).
Specifically, the forward-backward algorithm is implemented as follows:
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Algorithm A.1 A Forward-Backward Algorithm
# Forward process
for t = 1, ...,T
(i) augment Y misst using p
(
Y misst |Y
comp
t−1 ,Y
obs
t ,Ψ
)
, denoted as Y misst, f orward
(ii) update Y compt = Y misst, f orward
⊕
Y obst
end;
# Backward process
for t = T −1, ...,1
(i) augment Y misst using p
(
Y misst |Y
comp
t−1 ,Y
obs
t ,Ψ
)
· p
(
Y compt+1 |Y misst ,Y obst ,Ψ
)
, denoted as
Y misst,backward
(ii) update Y compt = Y misst,backward
⊕
Y obst
end;
A.2 Step 2: Parameter Estimation
After the imputation step (Revised Step 1) using data augmentation, we obtain individual-
level data with augmented Y misht , which we use for parameter estimation, i.e., sampling
p
(
Ψi+1|Y mis,Y obs
)
. In particular, we use a Bayesian hybrid Metropolis-Gibbs sampling
framework for parameter estimation, where parameters are drawn individually conditional
on others (“Gibbs”). while Metropolis is used to sample individual parameters where it is
infeasible to directly sample from the posterior. The framework begins with a step to gener-
ate latent preferences zAhg and z
B
hg using an augmentation process. Specifically, conditional
on all other parameters, for each period t, we augment zAhgt = z
A
hg+ε
A
hgt and z
B
hgt = z
B
hg+ε
B
hgt
such that, following the group decision mechanism, observed choice
{
Y Aht = g
A,Y Bht = g
B}
would be chosen by the members. Then, we draw zAhg and z
B
hg based on augmented z
A
hgt and
zBhgt .
After drawing latent preferences, we then use equations (5) and (6) to estimate δ Ah , δ
B
h ,α
BA
h ,
αABh , β and Σz. Specifically, equations (5) and (6) form a simultaneous equation model
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which can be rewritten as the follows:
[
zAhg z
B
hg
]
=
[
δ
A
h δ
B
h
]
+
[
XAhg X
B
hg
] β Ag 0
0 β Bg
(W−1)+[ uzA0hg uzB0hg
]
(A.2−1)
where W =
 1+αBA −αABh
−αBA 1+αABh
and (uzA0hg ,uzB0hg )∼MV N [0,(W−1)′Σz (W−1)].
We estimate the above equation using a 3-step process:
Step 1: Conditional on δ Ah , δ
B
h , α
BA
h ,α
AB
h , and Σz, we draw from the posterior distribution
of β . Note that after using the decomposition step described above, the equations (5) and
(6) become a seemingly uncorrelated regression (SUR) model which is conditional on δ Ah ,
δ Bh , α
BA
h , α
AB
h , Σz .
Step 2: We numerically draw αBAh and α
AB
h conditional on β and Σz. Specifically, for each(
αBAh ,α
AB
h
)
, we calculate
(
uzA0hg ,u
zB0
hg
)
after the decomposition step described above and
obtain the likelihood of
(
uzA0hg ,u
zB0
hg
)
∼MV N
[
0,
(
W−1
)′
Σz
(
W−1
)]
.
Step 3: We update δ Ah , δ
B
h , Σz conditional on α
BA
h ,α
AB
h and β .
After that, Metropolis-Hastings steps are used to update other parameters including behav-
ioral interaction (θ Ahg, θ
B
hg), state dependence (τ
A
hg, τ
B
hg), sensitivity to time-varying factors
(λ Ah , λ
B
h ), as well as decision power (γh).
Finally, we estimate the heterogeneity structures on intragroup dynamics and state-dependence
across households using regressions in the respective equations.
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Appendix B. Identification of Chapter 2
In this appendix, we provide simulated examples to show how variation across time helps
us disentangle the three group dynamics as well as preference heterogeneity. Note that,
with single-member households, we would be able to get expected preferences for certain
demographics. For example, the expected preference on drama for 40-year old male and so
on. For any two-member households, we then can have their expected preferences based on
their demographics. We can run a simulation to see what we expect the viewing behavior
would be based on their preferences (assuming no group dynamics). We call this as a “base
scenario”. As mentioned in Section 2.3, four factors may cause difference on observed
viewing behavior of the two-member household from the base scenario: any one or more
of the three group dynamics and/or preference heterogeneity. To identify these four factors
and know what causes the difference between observed household behavior and expected
behavior (i.e. base scenario), we would need variation to see that these four factors would
have different effects across different cases.
Specifically, we simulate a two-member household. We assume there are three choices (g1,
g2, g3) and there is a time-varying factor for each choice (Q1, Q2, Q3). We then simulate
10 cases of these time-varying factors: case 0 is a base case where Q1, Q2, Q3 are all 0;
case 1 to case 3 to have different values for Q1 respectively; case 4 to case 6 have different
values for Q2 respectively; and case 7 to case 9 we have different values for Q3 respec-
tively. We then simulate the viewing behavior at household level for the following five
scenarios: (1) a base scenario without any group dynamics and preference heterogeneity;
(2) with preference revision; (3) with behavior interaction; (4) with decision power; and (5)
with preference heterogeneity. For each scenario, we simulate the household-level viewing
behavior on the three choices under each of the 10 cases, then we compare and look into
the difference between each of scenarios 2 to 5 and the base scenario, scenario 1, in the
viewing behavior of the three choices.
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Figure B.1: Comparison of Viewing Behavior in Four Simulated Scenarios
Figure B.1 shows that difference between viewing behavior of the four scenarios with the
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base scenario on three choices respectively. For example, the solid line in the graph on the
left shows the difference between the scenario with decision power and the base scenario
on g1 viewing in the ten different cases. Note that, the variation across cases (which is
the variation across time-varying factors) give us variation to identify and separate the
four scenarios. For example, if there is a preference heterogeneity, we would expect a big
difference in g1 viewing in case 1 while if it is caused by other reasons, we would expect
a small difference in g1 viewing in case 1. Another example is that, if there is preference
revision, we would expect a big difference in case 6 for g2 viewing and the difference
increases from case 3 to case 6. As shown in Figure B.1, the four scenarios (the three group
dynamics and preference heterogeneity) have a different impact on viewing behavior under
these ten cases, which provides us information to disentangle these four factors.
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Appendix C. Estimation Results of Chapter 2
In this appendix, we present the estimation results of the full model. First, we review the
setting we have. We focus on the top 6 genres, and will consider all others as a genre called
“others”. We have 9 covariates, including household income, size of geographic location
(whether it is in a big city), age, gender, working hours per week, education level (whether
it is college or above), time spent on internet, whether is a household head, and whether
the household consist of a married couple. Note that, (1) the first three covariates and the
last one are at the household level, while the others are at the individual level; (2) the last
two covariates are for two-member households only. Accordingly, in the estimation of ζγ
we do not have coefficients for household level covariates since the regression estimation
for γ is based on the difference between two members. Household level covariates are the
same for the two members in the same household, so they are excluded from the regression
estimation for γ . For the last two covariates which are for two-member households only
but not single-member households, we do not have regression coefficients for β , ζτ and ζλ
since these regressions are based on both two-member and single-member households.
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C.1 Estimation Results of Parameters
Table C.1: Estimation Results of the Full Model of Chapter 2: β
β CS DN GD GV PV SE Os
int
-1.66
(0.65)
-1.33
(0.68)
-1.82
(0.54)
-1.54
(0.51)
-1.33
(0.46)
-2.51
(0.67)
-1.15
(0.46)
income
-0.14
(0.05)
-0.11
(0.05)
-0.15
(0.03)
-0.09
(0.05)
-0.07
(0.04)
-0.03
(0.03)
-0.1
(0.05)
size
0.02
(0.08)
0.02
(0.08)
0.02
(0.06)
0
(0.06)
0.05
(0.06)
0.01
(0.08)
-0.03
(0.07)
age
-0.02
(0.16)
-0.08
(0.15)
0.18
(0.13)
-0.08
(0.12)
-0.04
(0.11)
0.07
(0.15)
-0.19
(0.12)
gender
0
(0.08)
-0.13
(0.11)
-0.09
(0.09)
-0.06
(0.09)
-0.17
(0.08)
0.31
(0.09)
-0.04
(0.1)
work
0.2
(0.1)
0.02
(0.09)
0.09
(0.07)
0.09
(0.08)
0.11
(0.07)
0.13
(0.09)
0.08
(0.07)
edu
-0.18
(0.09)
-0.27
(0.07)
-0.1
(0.07)
-0.32
(0.07)
-0.26
(0.07)
-0.03
(0.07)
-0.26
(0.09)
internet
-0.03
(0.03)
-0.05
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.02)
-0.06
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.03)
-0.03
(0.03)
-0.03
(0.04)
Table C.1 shows the estimation results for β , which describes how demographics affect
the base preferences. As shown, higher income, higher education level and lower working
hours are associated with less time on TV. Males watch more sports while females watch
more participation variety (PV).
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Table C.2: Estimation Results of the Full Model of Chapter 2: ζτ
ζτ CS DN GD GV PV SE Os
int
4.22
(1.04)
2.33
(0.97)
2.78
(0.63)
2.61
(0.88)
2.18
(0.68)
2.68
(0.96)
3.07
(1.07)
income
0.12
(0.09)
0.19
(0.06)
0.09
(0.05)
0.17
(0.06)
0.08
(0.05)
0.06
(0.07)
0.03
(0.07)
size
-0.2
(0.1)
0.05
(0.14)
0.01
(0.09)
-0.01
(0.14)
-0.01
(0.1)
0.01
(0.11)
-0.02
(0.23)
age
-0.74
(0.27)
-0.19
(0.22)
-0.39
(0.14)
-0.28
(0.21)
-0.21
(0.16)
-0.18
(0.22)
-0.24
(0.24)
gender
0.1
(0.1)
0.03
(0.1)
0.09
(0.07)
-0.06
(0.12)
0.06
(0.07)
0.1
(0.11)
0.02
(0.12)
work
-0.19
(0.17)
-0.13
(0.12)
-0.04
(0.08)
-0.17
(0.13)
0.06
(0.09)
0.15
(0.13)
-0.05
(0.1)
edu
0.01
(0.14)
-0.14
(0.14)
-0.04
(0.09)
0.07
(0.15)
0.02
(0.09)
-0.16
(0.12)
0.11
(0.1)
internet
0.03
(0.05)
0.08
(0.05)
0.02
(0.03)
0
(0.04)
0.02
(0.03)
0.04
(0.05)
-0.03
(0.04)
Table C.2 shows the estimation results for ζτ , which describes how demographics affect
state dependence. As shown, higher income and younger people are associated with higher
state dependence.
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Table C.3: Estimation Results of the Full Model of Chapter 2: ζθ
ζθ CS DN GD GV PV SE Os
int
0.2
(0.83)
-0.61
(0.75)
-0.53
(0.85)
-0.03
(0.74)
-0.58
(0.65)
-1.37
(0.72)
-0.92
(0.77)
income
-0.06
(0.1)
0.02
(0.07)
0.02
(0.06)
-0.21
(0.08)
-0.01
(0.08)
0.24
(0.08)
-0.04
(0.06)
size
0.03
(0.11)
0.29
(0.12)
0.04
(0.09)
-0.02
(0.1)
0.07
(0.09)
-0.02
(0.12)
0.16
(0.12)
age
0.09
(0.21)
0.3
(0.16)
0.31
(0.2)
0.36
(0.17)
0.33
(0.15)
0.27
(0.16)
0.44
(0.19)
gender
0.2
(0.1)
0.14
(0.09)
-0.08
(0.09)
0.03
(0.09)
0.05
(0.09)
0.1
(0.09)
0.14
(0.09)
work
0.1
(0.14)
0.24
(0.14)
0.15
(0.11)
0.03
(0.09)
0.07
(0.1)
-0.06
(0.1)
0.06
(0.08)
edu5
0.17
(0.19)
0.24
(0.16)
-0.01
(0.09)
0.13
(0.13)
0.16
(0.08)
-0.17
(0.16)
0.2
(0.15)
internet
0.06
(0.06)
-0.02
(0.05)
-0.04
(0.05)
0.04
(0.04)
-0.02
(0.04)
-0.04
(0.04)
0.05
(0.05)
hh
0.21
(0.15)
-0.54
(0.11)
0.14
(0.1)
-0.19
(0.11)
0.07
(0.19)
0.09
(0.08)
-0.43
(0.15)
couple
-0.01
(0.11)
0.13
(0.1)
0.03
(0.08)
0.07
(0.1)
0.1
(0.09)
-0.1
(0.1)
-0.15
(0.1)
Table C.3 shows the estimation results for ζθ , which describes how demographics affect
behavioral interaction. As shown, higher income is associated with less behavioral interac-
tion in GV and higher behavioral interaction in Sports. People in large cities are associated
with high behavioral interaction in News. Older people are associated with high behavioral
interaction in most genres. Household heads are associated with less behavioral interaction
in News.
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Table C.4: Estimation Results of the Full Model of Chapter 2: ζα , ζγ , ζδ , ζλ
ζα ζγ ζδ ζλ
int
0.31
(0.62)
NA
-1.16
(0.35)
0.52
(0.55)
income
0.03
(0.04)
NA
0.05
(0.03)
-0.04
(0.03)
Size
-0.04
(0.06)
NA
-0.01
(0.06)
-0.03
(0.06)
Age
-0.03
(0.15)
0.02
(0.32)
0.08
(0.08)
0.13
(0.12)
gender
0.04
(0.07)
0.02
(0.07)
-0.02
(0.07)
-0.1
(0.06)
work
0.03
(0.06)
0.02
(0.12)
-0.1
(0.05)
0.03
(0.05)
edu
-0.02
(0.06)
0.03
(0.14)
0.06
(0.05)
0.08
(0.06)
internet
0
(0.02)
-0.03
(0.05)
0.03
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
hh
-0.02
(0.05)
0
(0.07)
0.19
(0.04)
NA
couple
-0.03
(0.07)
NA
0.06
(0.04)
NA
Table C.4 shows the estimation results for ζα , ζγ , ζδ , and ζλ , which describe how demo-
graphics affect the preference revision, decision power, preference shift and sensitivity to
time-varying factors respectively.
C.2 Distribution of Heterogeneity across Households
We then look into the heterogeneity of individuals in two-member households in terms of
their preferences (shown in Figure C.1 and Figure C.2), state dependence (Figure C.3 and
Figure C.4), behavioral interaction (Figure C.5 and Figure C.6), as well as their preference
revision, preference shift, decision power and sensitivity to time-varying factors (Figure
C.7).
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Figure C.1: Heterogeneity of Preference in Genres: Comedy, News Documentary, General
Drama, and General Variety
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Figure C.2: Heterogeneity of Preference in Genres: Participation Variety, Sports, Others
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Figure C.3: Heterogeneity of State Dependence in Genres: Comedy, News Documentary,
General Drama, and General Variety
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Figure C.4: Heterogeneity of State Dependence in Genres: Participation Variety, Sports,
Others
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Figure C.5: Heterogeneity of Behavioral Interaction in Genres: Comedy, News Documen-
tary, General Drama, and General Variety
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Figure C.6: Heterogeneity of Behavioral Interaction in Genres: Participation Variety,
Sports, Others
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Figure C.7: Heterogeneity of Preference Revision, Decision Power, Sensitivity, and Pref-
erence Shift
C.3 Comparison with Model Estimation Using Individual-Level Data
We further compare the estimation results using aggregate data which are shown above
with the estimation results of using individual-level data. If these two sets of results are
close to each other, then it means we are able to get similar results using aggregate data
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only (instead of using individual level data). Figure C.8 compares these two sets of es-
timation results, where each point on the graph stands for one of interest parameter (for
example, intercept term of β for genre 1); the horizontal axis describes estimation results
using individual-level data while the vertical axis denotes estimation results using aggre-
gate data. The dashed line shows where estimation using the two data sets generate the
same results. As shown in Figure C.8, most parameters are around the dashed line, which
means estimation results for most parameters are close to each other using these two data
sets.
Figure C.8: Comparison of Estimation Results with Winner-Maximization Mechanism:
Using Aggregate Data Versus Using Individual-level Data
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Appendix D. Joint-Optimization Decision Mechanism of Chap-
ter 2
In this appendix, we discuss another decision mechanism which we call “Joint Optimiza-
tion.” For the “Joint Optimization” mechanism, group members cooperate and work to-
gether to maximize the total group utility which is a weighted average of each group
member’s individual utility. This decision-making mechanism shares the same intuition of
Samuelson’s (1956) consensus model. According to Samuelson’s consensus model, group
members reach a consensus on maximizing a total welfare function of their individual util-
ities. It is acting like there is a hypothetical single agent (i.e., group head) who maximizes
the consensus social welfare function of the entire group. It is also consistent with previ-
ous literature of collective (cooperative) models (e.g., Apps and Rees 1988; Browning and
Chiappori 1998; Chiappori 1988, 1992), which assumes individuals make Pareto-efficient
decisions resulting from an intragroup bargaining process (Browning and Chiappori 1998;
Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen 2012; Chiappori 1988; Zhang et al. 2009).
Following previous literature (e.g., Samuelson 1956, Kato and Matsumoto 2009), we as-
sume that the two members follow the Harsanyi decision heuristic (Arora and Allenby
1999, Krisnamurthi 1988) for group decision making. In this case, the household chooses
a choice to maximize the weighted total utility as follows:
Uht
(
gA,gB
)
= γh ·UAht
(
gA,gB
)
+(1− γh) ·UBht
(
gA,gB
)
(4.1)
where Uht
(
gA,gB
)
is the weighted total utility when member A consumes gA and member
B consumes gB. γh refers to the weight of member A’s utility.
Following the decision mechanism, the probability of household members to choose a
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choice of
{
yAht = g
A,yBht = g
B} is
p
{(
yAht = g
A,yBht = g
B
)}
= p
{
Uht
(
gA,gB
)
≥Uht
(
g̃A, g̃B
)}
(4.2)
where
(
g̃A, g̃B
)
refers to any other feasible consumption choices available to household
members.
We apply the model to the same empirical setting in Section 2.4 with Joint-Optimization
decision mechanism instead of Winner-Maximization.We further compare the estimation
results using aggregate data with the estimation results of using individual-level data. Fig-
ure D.1 compares these two sets of estimation results, where each point on the graph
stands for one interested parameter; the horizontal axis describes estimation results us-
ing individual-level data while the vertical axis denotes estimation results using aggregate
data. The dashed line is a line to show where estimation using the two data sets generate
the same results. As shown in Figure D.1, most parameters are around the dashed line,
which means estimation results for most parameters are close to each other using these two
data sets.
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Figure D.1: Comparison of Estimation Results with Joint-Optimization Mechanism: Using
Aggregate Data Versus Using Individual-level Data
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Appendix E. Identification of Chapter 3
In this appendix, we use a numerical example to show the identification source of the
proposed model. We simulate consumption data for a consumer in the following three
scenarios: (1) the consumer is not variety-seeking and not inertial; (2) the consumer is
variety-seeking, and (3) the consumer is inertial. Then we examine the variation we can
observe from the non-ordered data to identify the variety-seeking/inertia and how consump-
tion outcomes affect the variety-seeking/inertia. Specifically, we simulate the following: a
consumer consumes three options (A, B and C) with one attribute. The distance on the
attribute between A and B, B and C, A and C are 1, 1, 2 respectively. We further assume
the following parameter values: zA = zB = zc = 0, so the consumer equally prefers the three
options; α = 0, α = 2, and α =−2 for the three scenarios respectively, where a positive α
stands for variety-seeking while a negative one stands for inertia; β = 1, so we assume that
consumption outcomes are positively related with the variety-seeking behavior. Consump-
tion outcomes are randomly generated from a standard normal distribution.
For each of the three scenarios, we simulate the consumption behavior of the consumer in
60 days; each day has five consumption occasions. The five consumption occasions within
each day are non-ordered. For each scenario, we do the following: (1) summarize the num-
ber of times each option is consumed (which is from the non-ordered data). For example,
we observe the consumer consumes A twice, B once, and C twice on day 1 in the first
scenario; (2) for each option, we calculate the average number of times it is consumed each
day across the 60 days, as well as the variance. We then compare the summary statistics
from these three scenarios in the following table (for example, in scenario 1 where α = 0,
option A is consumed 1.87 times each day on average, with a variance of 1.03):
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Table E.1: Mean and Variance of the Number of Times Consumed in Three Scenarios of
Chapter 3
A B C
α = 0
mean 1.87 1.62 1.52
variance 1.03 1.02 1.20
α = 2
mean 2.20 0.60 2.20
variance 0.37 0.45 0.26
α =−2 mean 1.40 1.90 1.70
variance 3.06 2.77 3.50
The above table shows that, the variance (of the number of times each option consumed
across the 60 days) are different in the three scenario, which provides us the information to
identify whether the consumer is variety-seeking or inertial. For example, option A has a
variance of 1.03, 0.37 and 3.06 in the three scenarios respectively. The other two options
have similar variances also. When α = 2, the consumer is variety-seeking, the variance is
smaller (so we observe that option A is consumed almost every day around 2 to 3 times);
while when α = 3, the consumer is inertial, the variance is much bigger (so we observe that
option A is consumed five times on some days while not consumed at all on some other
days). This is because, when the consumer is variety-seeking, she widely explores different
options within each day; when the consumer is inertial, she usually focuses on one or two
options each day (so it is more likely for us to observe that an option is consumed five
times in some days). Therefore, the variation of the number of times that each option is
consumed across days allow us to identify the variety-seeking/inertia of the consumer.
Then, we further examine how we can identify the effect of consumption outcomes on
the variety-seeking/inertia. To do so, we take the third scenario, α = −2, as an example.
In this scenario, we illustrate how the consumption outcomes affect the non-ordered data
observed. We follow the same way to calculate the mean and variance of the number
of times that each option is consumed (as in the table above), but this time, we separate
the 60 days into two groups according to the average consumption outcomes each day.
Specifically, for each of the 60 days, we calculate the average consumption outcomes of the
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five consumption occasions. We then consider the 30 days with lower average consumption
outcomes in a group, and the other 30 days in another group.
Table E.2: Mean and Variance of the Number of Times Consumed in Two Groups of Chap-
ter 3
A B C
lower consumption outcomes
mean 1.67 1.80 2.10
variance 3.97 3.22 4.69
higher consumption outcomes
mean 1.67 1.77 1.38
variance 2.46 2.17 2.16
As shown in the table above, the group with lower average consumption outcomes has
a higher variance (which indicates more inertia) than the other group. So on days with
low average consumption outcomes, it is more likely to observe a large variation on the
number of times that each option is consumed. This provides us the information that the
consumption outcomes is positively related to the variety-seeking (and negatively related
to the inertia).
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